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THE EXXON VALDEZ CASE AND
REGULARIZING PUNISHMENT
BY JEFFREY L. FISHER*
ABSTRACT
In this Article, the Author discusses the implications of the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker for the Court’s
ongoing punitive damages jurisprudence, as well as for the Constitution’s
regulation of punishment more generally. The Exxon decision reveals that,
notwithstanding modern rhetoric decrying supposedly “skyrocketing”
punitive damages awards, the Court is troubled by the common law system of
awarding punitive damages not so much because of the size of awards it
allows as because of such awards’ perceived unpredictability. From this
insight, the Author argues that the Court’s concerns about large punitive
damage awards are therefore essentially procedural, not substantive, in
nature. That is, the Court’s current concerns over punitive damages mirror
criticisms levied a generation ago against systems of criminal sentencing that
generated vast and unjustified disparities in punishment. The constitutional
imperative, now as then, is to regularize punishment. But that is all, the
Author contends, that the Constitution really requires: once legislatures step
into the breach and set to regulating punitive damages, the Court should
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case: Because I believe deeply in the plaintiffs’ cause, it would be easy for me to
use this forum to pen a jeremiad criticizing all that I think was wrong or unfair
concerning the Court’s resolution of the case—particularly the Court’s ultimate
judgment that there was nothing unusually reprehensible about Exxon’s
conduct. But I have decided not to do that. Rather, I seek to understand the
Court’s decision on its own terms. My hope is that elucidating the Court’s
reasoning will provide legislatures, organizations, and citizens interested in
preserving the availability of stiff punitive damages in appropriate future cases
with an understanding of how to go about doing that.
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defer to legislatures’ policy goals and chosen means of effectuating them. In
particular, if a legislature decides to gives its democratic imprimatur to large
punitive awards, the Court should accede to such determinations in the same
way it regularly accedes to legislative determinations dictating exceptionally
severe criminal punishment.
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INTRODUCTION
At last, we arrive at the root of the problem.
We have known for roughly two decades that the Supreme Court is
troubled by the modern, common-law system of awarding punitive
damages.1 After grumbling about increasingly large punitive awards in
the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Court has invoked the Due Process
Clause in four cases over the past twelve years to strike down a series of

1. By “common-law system of punitive damages,” I mean the system under
which juries may award punitive damages in tort cases in order to punish and
deter certain kinds of reprehensible behavior and face no statutory constraints
with respect to the amount they may award. See infra notes 26–30.
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multi-million dollar awards.2 But the Court has been rather imprecise
about what exactly is problematic about the common-law system for
awarding punitive damages. At times, the Court has described
unconstitutional awards as “grossly excessive,”3 or disproportionate,
with respect to the defendant’s conduct.4 At others, it has derided
punitive awards as “arbitrary”5 and faulted the “imprecise” and
“discretion[ary]” manner6 in which they were administered.7 In other
words, the Court has vacillated concerning the basic issue of whether
the problem plaguing the common-law system of awarding punitive
damages is substantive or procedural in nature (or some combination of
both).
The stakes of this conceptualization are high. If the problem with
the modern system of awarding punitive damages is a substantive one,
then the Court’s holdings mean that the Due Process Clause in any
given case flatly forbids a jury from imposing punitive damages above a
given level—apparently some low-level multiple of the underlying
compensatory damages—no matter how much notice the defendant
received that a bigger award was possible or how fair the trial was. But
if the problem with the modern system of awarding punitive damages is
essentially a procedural one, then the Court’s holdings mean that
legislatures and courts could allow punitive damages far in excess of
low-single-digit ratios so long as the governing law provides fair notice,
the court gives clear jury instructions, and related rules of fair play are
followed.
The Supreme Court’s decision to review the $5 billion punitive
damages award arising from the notorious Exxon Valdez oil spill—
reduced to $2.5 billion by the Ninth Circuit—offered the prospect that
the Court would finally pin down the conceptual basis for exerting
serious appellate review over punitive damages. Exxon’s challenge to
the award, which was roughly five times the plaintiffs’ compensatory
recoveries, was largely substantive in nature.8 And the trial in the case

2. See Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007); State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003); Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman
Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001); BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
3. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 417; Cooper, 532 U.S. at 434; BMW, 517 U.S. at 574.
4. Cooper, 532 U.S. at 434; BMW, 517 U.S. at 575.
5. Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 351; State Farm, 538 U.S. at 416.
6. State Farm, 538 U.S. at 417.
7. Philip Morris, 549 U.S. at 352; State Farm, 538 U.S. at 416.
8. One of Exxon’s arguments—that the jury was inappropriately allowed to
consider its wealth—was procedural in character. See Brief for Petitioner at 55–
56, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008) (No. 07-219). But the
Court ultimately declined to address the argument. See generally Exxon Shipping
Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008).

FISHER_FMT6.DOC

4

5/1/2009 4:29:14 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

VOL. 26:1

had been managed to avoid various procedural pitfalls: the trial court
created a “mandatory punitive damages class” to avoid the prospect of
double punishment; the trial court made sure that the jury did not hear
any evidence concerning Exxon’s actions in other jurisdictions or
respecting anyone besides the plaintiff class; and the trial court gave the
jury “unusually detailed” instructions to guide the jury’s discretion in
calibrating any punitive award to what it determined to be the nature of
Exxon’s wrongdoing.9 Finally, there was reason to expect a clear
theoretical explication from the Supreme Court because the case was
grounded in maritime law—a form of federal common law. This legal
framework rendered the Supreme Court more free than in purely
constitutional cases arising from state-court judgments to reveal and to
implement its own policy preferences concerning “the desirability of
regulating [punitive damages] as a common law remedy.”10
The result in Exxon seems to reinforce the prevailing view that the
Court’s punitive damages jurisprudence has a robust substantive
component.11 The Court reduced the award from roughly $2.5 billion to
$500 million, or from a five-to-one ratio to compensatory damages to a
one-to-one ratio.12 The business bar already is propounding the decision
as a substantive decision, suggesting that the Constitution limits
punitive awards to a one-to-one ratio of compensatory damages, at least
when such damages are substantial and the conduct giving rise to the
award is something short of extraordinarily reprehensible.13
9. In re the Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1080–82 (D. Alaska 2004).
10. Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2626–27.
11. For examples of scholarly pieces before Exxon claiming that this
jurisprudence was substantive in nature, see Erwin Chemerinsky, The
Constitution and Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1056–57 (2004); Samuel
Issacharoff & Catherine Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353,
1426 (2006) (asserting that “Gore and Campbell have effectuated a substantive
rather than merely procedural revision of punitive damages law”); Cass R.
Sunstein, et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation
in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2087 (1998); Benjamin C. Zipursky, A Theory of
Punitive Damages, 84 TEX. L. REV. 105, 118–19, 127–28 (2005).
12. Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. 2605.
13. See David T. Leitch, Is There a Constitution in (the) House?, 12 GREEN BAG
2d 23, 33 (2008); Lester Sotsky & Daniel J. Stewart, Punitives Post-‘Exxon,’ NAT’L
L.J., Sept. 29, 2008, at 12; Lewis Goldshore & Marsha Wolf, The Mother of All Oil
Spills, 193 N.J. L.J., 510, No. 7, Index 473 (Aug. 18, 2008) (quoting Robin Conrad,
executive vice president of National Chamber Litigation Center, as interpreting
Exxon as “[l]imiting punitive damages to no more than the amount of [a]
compensatory award”); 2 Robert L. Haig, BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LITIGATION
IN FEDERAL COURTS § 42:66.70 (2d ed. 2008); 4 Andrew L. Frey et al., BUSINESS AND
COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN FEDERAL COURTS § 42:66.70 (2d ed. 2008). Just three
months after Exxon was handed down, the American Tort Reform Association
and the Chamber of Commerce filed an amicus brief in the U.S. Supreme Court,
asking the Court explicitly to hold that the Constitution imposes a one-to-one
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The Court’s opinion, however, reveals that its concerns with
punitive awards are far less substantive than the result would suggest.
“The real problem,” the Court said, “is the stark unpredictability of
punitive awards.”14 The “spread between high and low individual
awards,” the Court continued, “is unacceptable.”15 So in the absence of
any statutory framework governing the size of maritime punitive
awards, the Court felt entitled to establish a presumptive cap on awards
that was just above the average amount awarded by juries in tort cases
involving similar misconduct.16
The Court’s emphasis on unpredictability—rather than its dramatic
one-to-one remedy—finally reveals the Court’s true source of unease
with the modern system of awarding punitive damages. In a nutshell,
this Article contends, the Court perceives the common-law system of
imposing civil punishment as mirroring two historically erratic systems
of imposing criminal punishment. The Court expressly referred to one
such system: the sentencing system for noncapital felonies that prevailed
in federal courts before the advent of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines.17 Under that system, judges had unfettered discretion to
choose sentences within enormous ranges.18 Judges, as a functional
matter, could follow any theory of punishment they desired, and they
could rely on any factors they wished in selecting sentences.19
Consequently, a defendant who came up for sentencing had “no way of
knowing or reliably predicting whether he [would] walk out of the
courtroom on probation, or be locked up for a term of years that may
consume the rest of his life, or something in between.”20
The second system—unmentioned by the Court, but seemingly
equally if not more salient—is the system of capital punishment that
existed in the states prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Furman v.

ratio in cases involving “very large compensatory damages and questionable
reprehensibility.” Brief for American Tort Reform Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners at 14, NiSource, Inc. v. Estate of Garrison G. Tawney, 129
S. Ct. 626 (2008) (No. 08-219), 2008 WL 4325538. At least one lower court already
has accepted this argument. See Jurinko v. Medical Protective Co., No. 06-3519,
2008 WL 5378011 (3d Cir. Dec. 24, 2008).
14. Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2625.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 2634.
17. Id. at 2626–28.
18. Id. at 2628 (noting that under the “indeterminate” federal system, judges
had “relatively unguided discretion to sentence within a wide range,” and
“similarly situated offenders were sentenced [to], and did actually serve, widely
disparate sentences”).
19. Id.
20. MARVIN FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 6 (1972).
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Georgia.21 Under that system, every defendant convicted of murder or
another capital offense was subject to the death penalty. Yet state law
gave juries no rules or even guidance toward determining which
offenders should be sentenced to death. As a result, capital punishment
was arbitrarily imposed on an unlucky—rather than a necessarily more
reprehensible—slice of the class of eligible offenders.22
The Court’s treating the common law system of awarding punitive
damages as equivalent to unstructured systems of imposing criminal
punishment reveals that its recent invocation of due process principles
to invalidate punitive awards is, at once, quite unremarkable and quite
dramatic. It is unremarkable in the sense that it is boilerplate
constitutional law that punishment may not be imposed arbitrarily.
That, indeed, is the essence of the rule of law. It animates foundational
due process principles such as the void-for-vagueness doctrine.23
Furthermore, unpredictability is an infirmity that is easily addressed (at
least in the sense of reducing unpredictability to a constitutionally
acceptable level). For example, following Frankel’s critique of the federal
sentencing system and the Court’s decision in Furman, legislatures
stepped in to regularize criminal punishment in those realms. The result,
a generation later, is a body of constitutional law in which the Supreme
Court defers almost completely to legislative and administrative bodies
concerning the permissible length of prison sentences and even as to
when capital punishment may be imposed. There is no reason to believe
that punitive damages law could not follow a similar path.
At the same time, the Court’s suggestion that any system of
punishment that produces erratic results violates the Due Process Clause
is dramatic—even radical—in that it elevates the importance of
legislation to a new and fairly extraordinary level. The Court historically
has allowed states and the federal government to determine levels of
punishment according to common law, relying within its elastic
boundaries on individualized judgments of judges and juries. But now,
even systems of punishment with deep common-law traditions of
regulating discretion at a relatively high level are subject to
constitutional challenge to the extent that they generate apparently
unjustified disparities. The Court now reads the Due Process Clause, in
short, to require policymaking bodies to regularize, through positive
law, not just the presence but also the amount of punishment—and to
give their democratic imprimatur to any regime allowing unusually
harsh penalties.
21. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
22. Id. at 309–10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
23. See, e.g., Kolendar v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358 (1983).
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The four parts of this article that follow explore the implications of
this new brand of due process. More specifically, the Article lays out the
implications of bringing punitive damages jurisprudence expressly into
line with the regularization principle that exists in criminal sentencing
law. The Article also describes the potential significance of doing the
reverse—that is, applying the regularization principle as it already exists
in punitive damages law to certain criminal sentencing systems to which
the Supreme Court has not yet turned its attention.
Part I quickly traces the arc of the Court’s recent punitive damages
jurisprudence, from the Court’s refusal to protect defendants from
“excessive” punishment under the Eighth Amendment, to its
development of the current due process framework for reviewing
punitive awards. Part II unpacks the analysis and holding of the Exxon
case. Part III compares this analysis to the criminal sentencing reform
movement and to the Furman revolution, describing how the same basic
procedural concern animates each: a motivation to regularize
punishment.
Part IV is the meat of the article. It ponders the largely unexamined
doctrinal consequences of the Court’s sharpened focus on regularizing
punishment in punitive damages cases.24 It does so in relatively broad
brush strokes, providing more a schematic for legal and doctrinal
development than a prolonged consideration of any particular
theoretical detail.
Section A deals with the future of the Court’s punitive damages
jurisprudence. It explains, first, how the Court’s insistence that
punishment be regularized puts a premium on legislative involvement
in authorizing and regulating punitive damages. Second, this section
posits that once legislatures take responsibility for punitive damages,
they have discretion to pursue a diverse array of goals through such
damages. For example, a legislature could choose—as the plaintiffs
24. No recent articles of which I am aware argue, as I do here, that the
Court’s punitive damages jurisprudence should be understood exclusively in
terms of a check on arbitrariness. One piece published last year argues, as I do
here, that criminal sentencing law should be expressly applied to punitive
damages awards, granting increased deference to punitive awards when
legislatures have expressly allowed the amount at issue. See Leo M. Romero,
Punitive Damages, Criminal Punishment, and Proportionality: The Importance of
Legislative Limits, 41 CONN L. REV. 109 (2008). But Professor Romero believes that
legislatively authorized levels of punitive awards should merely “assist courts in
the proportionality analysis” of such awards, id. at 119–20, whereas I contend
that such limits should render substantive judicial analysis virtually nonexistent.
Furthermore, Professor Romero approaches the question of proportionality
solely from the perspective of retribution, see id. at 120–24, whereas I consider
whether a state may pursue interests other than retribution in allowing punitive
damages. See infra notes 159–163 and accompanying text.
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unsuccessfully argued in the absence of legislation in Exxon—to allow
enhanced punitive damages as quasi-compensation when necessary to
force a defendant to internalize the full impact of its wrongdoing. Third,
this section emphasizes that Congress and state legislatures have more
leeway than one might think to statutorily authorize stiff punitive
damage awards. In particular, they have discretion to allow punitive
damages far exceeding a one-to-one ratio to compensatory damages,
even in cases involving substantial damages.
Section B turns the tables and quickly sketches the potential impact
of the Court’s insistence on regularization on certain states’ criminal
sentencing systems. While many such systems contain sufficient positive
law to satisfy the Court’s concerns regarding predictability, some
systems (perhaps a majority) still grant juries and judges expansive and
virtually unregulated discretion to calibrate noncapital prison sentences.
Outlier sentences imposed under these unstructured systems appear
now to be susceptible to due process challenges.

I. LEGAL ORIGINS OF, AND MODERN RESTRICTIONS ON, PUNITIVE
DAMAGES
A. Background
For centuries, juries have been allowed to impose punitive
damages in tort cases.25 Though the precise purposes of such damages
have varied somewhat over the years, modern courts generally agree
that the predominant purposes of such damages are to punish and deter
reprehensible behavior.26
Under the common-law method of assessing punitive damages, a
jury need not abide by any particular numerical limitations in setting the
amount of such an award. As the Supreme Court has put it, the jury is
simply “instructed to consider the gravity of the wrong and the need to
deter similar wrongful conduct.”27 With this generalized guidance, the
jury is largely free, “as the voice of the community,” to decide how
much money the defendant should be forced to pay to the plaintiff.28
The defendant has a right to appeal, but review is limited to whether the

25. See generally Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 363, 371 (1851) (recounting this
history in the courts of upholding punitive damages judgments).
26. See, e.g., BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996).
27. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 15 (1991).
28. BMW, 517 U.S. at 600 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Barry v. Edmunds,
116 U.S. 550, 565 (1886) (“[N]othing is better settled than that . . . it is the peculiar
function of the jury to determine the amount [of punitive damages]”); Day, 54
U.S. at 371 (task of determining proper amount traditionally left to jury).
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jury abused its discretion or acted with passion or prejudice—a test that
might sound meaningful but that itself is discretionary and is generally
perceived as being quite weak.29
Twenty-one states—mainly in recent times—have established
monetary caps on punitive damages or limits on the ratio a punitive
award may bear to compensatory damages.30 Numerous federal
statutory causes of action that allow for punitive damages limit them in
a like manner.31 But the majority of states still impose no limit at all,32 as
do the majority of federal statutes, such as the frequently invoked 42
U.S.C. § 1983.33
29. See, e.g., Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424,
433–35 (2001) (abuse of discretion); Haslip, 499 U.S. at 15 (appellate review for
“reasonable[ness]”); Hardeman v. City of Albuquerque, 377 F.3d 1106, 1121–22
(10th Cir. 2004) (“passion” or “prejudice”).
30. See Cooper, 532 U.S. at 433 n.6; BMW, 517 U.S. at 614–16 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (collecting such statutes).
31. See, e.g., 6 U.S.C. § 1142 (2006) (whistleblower protection for public
transportation employees, limited to $250,000); 7 U.S.C. § 18 (2006) (violation of
law governing commodity brokers; limited to two times actual damages); id.
(violations of Commodities Exchange Act, limited to twice actual loss); 7 U.S.C. §
21 (2006) (violation of law governing futures exchanges, limited to two times
actual damages); id. (registered commodities futures association, limited to twice
actual loss); 7 U.S.C. § 25 (2006) (violations of Commodities Futures Trading Act,
limited to twice actual loss); id. (violation of law governing commodity
exchanges, limited to two times actual damages); 15 U.S.C. § 1691e (2006) (equal
credit opportunity, limited to $10,000 or 1% of net worth); 42 U.S.C. § 1981a
(2006) (intentional employment discrimination, limited to $50,000 to $300,000,
depending on size of employer); 49 U.S.C. § 20109 (2006) (whistleblower actions
related to rail transportation, limited to $250,000); 49 U.S.C. § 31105 (2006)
(retaliation for actions related to motor vehicle safety, limited to $250,000).
32. See Michael L. Rustad, The Closing of Punitive Damages’ Iron Cage, 38 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1297, 1339–46 (2005).
33. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983) (holding that punitive damages are
available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). For a selection of other federal statutes
allowing punitive damages, see 11 U.S.C. § 303 (2006) (bad faith filing of
bankruptcy petition); 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2006) (willful breach of automatic stay in
bankruptcy); 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2006) (bid-rigging by purchasers from bankruptcy
estate); 12 U.S.C. § 3417 (2006) (breach of financial privacy by government
agency); 15 U.S.C. § 78u (2006) (wrongful disclosure of financial information by
SEC); 15 U.S.C. § 298 (2006) (frivolous suit by jewelry trade association); 15
U.S.C. § 1116 (2006) (wrongful seizure under the trademark act); 15 U.S.C. §
1679g (2006) (violations by credit repair agencies); 15 U.S.C. § 1681n (2006)
(unauthorized disclosure of consumer credit reports); 15 U.S.C. § 1691e
(unauthorized disclosure by government agency of consumer credit reports); 17
U.S.C. § 1322 (2006) (wrongful injunction for copyright violation); 18 U.S.C. § 248
(2006) (interference with access to reproductive health clinics); 18 U.S.C. § 2252A
(2006) (child pornography); 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (2006) (wiretapping); 18 U.S.C. §
2707 (2006) (unauthorized disclosure of electronic communications information);
18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2006) (wrongful disclosure of video tape rental or sale records);
18 U.S.C. § 2724 (2006) (unauthorized release of information from state motor
vehicle records); 20 U.S.C. § 1095a (2006) (discharge or discipline of employee
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The Supreme Court’s Development of Restrictions on Punitive
Awards

Starting in the 1980s, the business bar undertook a concerted effort
to curtail the effects of this system, particularly its ability to generate
multimillion dollar awards. The bar’s first line of attack wielded the
Eighth Amendment, which provides that “excessive fines” shall not be
imposed, “nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”34 When the
matter reached the Supreme Court, the defendant in a state antitrust
action, Browning-Farris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., urged the Court
to hold that the Eighth Amendment applied to punitive damages,
thereby prohibiting any award the Court deemed excessive.35 The Court
rejected the argument, holding that the Eighth Amendment applies only
to state-imposed punishment, not to cases between private parties.36
At the same time, the Court reserved the question whether the Due
Process Clause might sometimes prohibit punitive damages above
certain levels by “act[ing] as a check on undue jury discretion to award
punitive damages in the absence of any express statutory limit.”37 In a
concurrence, Justice Brennan (joined by Justice Marshall) explained why
due process might well impose such a restriction:
Without statutory (or at least common-law) standards for the
determination of how large an award of punitive damages is
appropriate in a given case, juries are left largely to themselves
in making this important, and potentially devastating, decision.
Indeed, the jury in this case was sent to the jury room with
nothing more than the following terse instruction: “In
determining the amount of punitive damages, . . . you may take

whose salary is garnished); 25 U.S.C. § 305e (2006) (misrepresentation of Indianproduced goods); 26 U.S.C. § 7431 (2006) (unauthorized inspection of tax return
information); 31 U.S.C. § 3720D (2006) (discharge of employee whose wages are
garnished to satisfy U.S. claim); 33 U.S.C. § 1514 (2006) (violation of regulations
of deepwater ports, U.S. suit only); 39 U.S.C. § 3018 (2006) (mailing hazardous
materials, US suit only); 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-23 (2006) (liability of vaccine
manufacturers); 42 U.S.C. § 669a (2006) (improper disclosure of financial
information); 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (2006) (discriminatory housing practice); 47 U.S.C.
§ 338 (2006) (protection of privacy by satellite carrier); 47 U.S.C. § 551 (2006)
(protection of cable subscriber privacy); 49 U.S.C. § 507 (2006) (transportation
enforcement, actions by Attorney General only); 49 U.S.C. § 5122 (2006) (hazmat
transportation, actions by Attorney General only); 49 U.S.C. § 60120 (2006)
(pipeline safety, actions by Attorney General only).
34. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
35. See Browning-Farris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 275–76
(1989).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 276–77.
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into account the character of the defendants, their financial
standing, and the nature of their acts.” Guidance like this is
scarcely better than no guidance at all. I do not suggest that the
instruction itself was in error; indeed, it appears to have been a
correct statement of Vermont law. The point is, rather, that the
instruction reveals a deeper flaw: the fact that punitive
damages are imposed by juries guided by little more than an
admonition to do what they think is best. Because “‘[t]he
touchstone of due process is protection of the individual
against arbitrary action of government,’” Daniels v. Williams,
474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986), quoting Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539 (1974), I for one would look longer and harder at an award
of punitive damages based on such skeletal guidance than I
would at one situated within a range of penalties as to which
responsible officials had deliberated and then agreed.38
The Court took up this subject in earnest, and ushered in its
modern punitive damages jurisprudence, in BMW v. Gore.39 There, an
Alabama jury, employing the common-law method of imposing
punitive damages, imposed a punitive award of $2 million on the
automobile manufacturer for failing to disclose that a car had been
damaged and repainted prior to sale.40 The $2 million sum was about
500 times the amount of the underlying harm.41 Declaring that
“[e]lementary notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional
jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice . . . of the severity
of the penalty that a State may impose,” the Court held that the jury’s
award was “grossly excessive.”42
There is obvious tension in this language. The Court’s emphasis on
“fair notice” is purely procedural. It suggests that if the Alabama
Legislature had passed a law prior to the case establishing that any
egregious instance of failure to disclose warranted punitive damages of
$2 million or 500 times the underlying harm, then the award would have
satisfied due process. On the other hand, the Court’s characterization of
the award as “grossly excessive” in light of the absence of aggravating
factors typically associated with particularly reprehensible conduct is a
substantive criticism. It suggests that no amount of fair notice would
have allowed the jury to impose such a large punitive award.
The Court also drew comparisons between the jury’s award and

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 281.
517 U.S. 559 (1996).
Id. at 599.
Id. at 583.
Id. at 574–75.
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penalties that the Alabama Legislature had established for similar
misconduct. But like other components of its analysis, this comparison
was not clearly procedural or substantive. A punitive award’s imbalance
compared to penalties for similar conduct might show that if the
defendant lacked fair notice it could face an award this large.
Alternatively, such an imbalance could support a finding that an award
is too big in absolute terms.
The Court’s decision seven years later, in State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell,43 led most courts and commentators
to conclude that the Supreme Court’s concerns with punitive damages
are substantive in nature. In State Farm, the Court confronted a $145
million punitive verdict that a Utah jury imposed in conjunction with a
$1 million compensatory award for emotional distress a couple suffered
while worrying that their insurance company would not cover a claim
against them. The Court held that the punitive award was
unsustainable.44 Speaking well beyond the facts of that case, the Court
further suggested that at least when compensatory damages are
“substantial,” then only a low ratio of punitive damages to
compensatory damages—perhaps only one-to-one—can satisfy the Due
Process Clause.45 The Court described this rule as imposing a
“substantive constitutional limitation[]” on punitive damages.46
Still, to the extent that the State Farm Court offered justifications for
advancing this purportedly substantive rule, it offered procedural
critiques of Utah’s system of awarding punitive damages. The Court
emphasized that defendants deserve “fair notice . . . of the severity of
punishment that a state may impose”; that juries presented with
marginally relevant and inflammatory evidence, as well as “vague
instructions” are unable to behave rationally; and, more generally, that
“defendants subjected to punitive damages in civil cases [are not]
accorded the protections applicable in a criminal proceeding.”47 None of
these problems, as a theoretical matter, is insurmountable. Each can be
fixed in a way that still leaves tortfeasors and other defendants exposed
to large punitive awards.

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

538 U.S. 408 (2003).
Id.
Id. at 425.
Id. at 416.
Id. at 417–18.
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II. THE EXXON CASE
On March 23, 1989, the supertanker Exxon Valdez departed Port
Valdez, Alaska, loaded with 53 million gallons of crude oil.48 Captain
Joseph Hazelwood, the master of the vessel and a relapsed alcoholic,
had spent the day at waterfront bars drinking with crew members.49 He
had consumed between five and nine double vodkas (between fifteen
and twenty-seven ounces of 80-proof alcohol),50 and his blood alcohol
level stood at about .241.51 He was “so drunk that a non-alcoholic would
have passed out,”52 and he faced night voyage through the “icy and
treacherous waters of Prince William Sound.”53
While passing through the Sound’s commercial fishing waters,
which sustained the regional economy and provided a subsistence
lifestyle to thousands of Alaska Natives, Hazelwood steered the vessel
away from some ice and toward Bligh Reef, a “known and foreseen
hazard.”54 With the reef only minutes away, Hazelwood abandoned the
bridge and went down to his cabin.55 He left control to the third mate—
who was “fatigued” on his second consecutive watch—with “vague”
orders concerning the “tricky” turn necessary to avoid the approaching
reef.56 With the third mate unable to perform both his own job and
Hazelwood’s, the supertanker struck the reef. Eleven million gallons of
the vessel’s toxic cargo gushed into the Sound, causing the “most
notorious oil spill in recent times”57 and the “largest oil spill and greatest
environmental disaster in American history.”58
Thousands of plaintiffs filed suit against Exxon, seeking
compensatory and punitive damages under maritime tort law.
Eventually, at Exxon’s request, the district court established a
mandatory punitive damages class of some 32,000 individuals and
businesses, ensuring that any punitive award the jury imposed would
be the one and only such award Exxon would have to pay.59 The district
48. In re the Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1077 (D. Alaska 2004).
49. In re the Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1223 (9th Cir. 2000).
50. Id.
51. In re the Exxon Valdez, Order No. 265, 1995 WL 527989, at *5 (D. Alaska
Jan. 27, 1995).
52. In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d at 1236.
53. Id. at 1238.
54. Id. at 1222.
55. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2612 (2008).
56. In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d at 1223, 1236.
57. United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 96 (2000).
58. In re the Exxon Valdez, Order No. 265, 1995 WL 527989, at *4 (D. Alaska
Jan. 27, 1995).
59. Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d at 1225; In re the Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d
1071, 1078 (D. Alaska 2004).
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court instructed the jury at trial—consistent with the principles the
Supreme Court would later establish in BMW and State Farm—that it
should calibrate any punitive award to the degree of Exxon’s
reprehensibility and that it should bear a reasonable relationship to the
plaintiffs’ compensatory damages, which totaled roughly $500 million.60
The instructions, however, did not require the jury to make any finding
beyond corporate recklessness in order to impose punitive damages.61
Nor did they require the jury to find any particular degree of fault or
anything else in order to impose punitive damages at any particular
level.62
The evidence at trial showed that Exxon, like the rest of the
industry, had long known that any spill in Prince William Sound would
be catastrophic because the region cradles an extremely valuable fishing
industry and is home to thousands of Alaska Natives who engage in a
subsistence lifestyle.63 At the same time, the Sound is quite remote, and
Exxon knew that it and other relevant authorities lacked enough cleanup equipment to react to a major spill.64 The plaintiffs further presented
extensive evidence that, notwithstanding having all of this general
knowledge, Exxon’s upper management had been aware for years
before the spill that Hazelwood had been drinking aboard their ships
and had declined to do anything to stop it.65 Exxon’s executives may
have declined to intervene in part because an alcoholic culture pervaded
Exxon Shipping Company, or perhaps they simply decided to ignore the
risk that Hazelwood presented. In any case, the jury agreed with the
plaintiffs that Exxon had acted recklessly66 and returned a punitive
verdict for $5 billion.67 The Ninth Circuit later cut the award in half to
60. At the time of trial, the parties entered into a stipulation agreeing that the
amount of compensable harm caused by the spill was between $432 million and
$768 million. Eventually, the district court quantified the figure at $513 million.
In re Exxon Valdez, 490 F.3d 1066, 1089 (9th Cir. 2007). Further refinements and
settlements reduced the final figure to $507.5 million. This figure includes not
just compensatory damages recovered at trial, but also payments Exxon made to
compensate fisherman after the spill and various settlement payments made to
other plaintiffs.
61. See In re the Exxon Valdez, Order No. 265, 1995 WL 527989, at *2 (D.
Alaska Jan. 27, 2995).
62. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2614 n.2 (2008). The
instructions did, however, give the jury guidance for assessing Exxon’s degree of
fault. See infra note 157 and accompanying text.
63. Brief for Respondents at 4, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605
(2008) (No. 07–219), 2008 WL 194284.
64. Id.
65. In re Exxon Valdez, 296 F.Supp.2d 1071, 1077 (D. Alaska 2004).
66. In re the Exxon Valdez, Order No. 265, 1995 WL 527989, at *5 (D. Alaska
Jan. 27, 2995).
67. In re Exxon Valdez, 296 F.Supp.2d at 1082.
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$2.5 billion.68
The Supreme Court granted review to assess, among other things,
the legality of the award’s size.69 Because the case was grounded in
maritime law, a species of federal common law, the Court claimed the
ability to assess the $2.5 billion award not simply through the lens of
defining “the outer limit allowed by due process,” but through the
quasi-legislative lens of considering public policy—namely, “the
desirability of regulating [punitive damages] as a common law
remedy.”70 Still, the Court wove much of its constitutional jurisprudence
into its analysis. Indeed, the best reading of the Court’s opinion is that it
saw this case as an occasion to sharpen its critique of the common law
system of awarding punitive damages, rather than to develop any new
kind of approach to reviewing such awards.71 The opinion therefore
gives especially valuable insight into the Court’s motivation for its
current regulation of punitive damages.
The Court began by explaining that the problem with the modern
common law system for imposing punitive damages is not that awards
are generally too large or too frequently awarded.72 Citing various
empirical studies, the Court noted that the median ratio of punitive to
compensatory damages (about 0.65 to 1) has remained relatively
constant over the past several decades.73 The Court further found no
marked increase over the past several decades in the percentage of cases
with punitive awards.74
“The real problem,” the Court concluded, “is the stark
unpredictability of punitive awards.”75 The Court cited data indicating
that the common law system produces occasional “outlier cases [that]
subject defendants to punitive damages that dwarf corresponding
compensatories.”76 The data troubled the Court because nothing
suggested to it that the outlier cases correspond to particularly egregious
behavior.77 Rather, the Court’s intuition was that cases with “strikingly
similar facts” were sometimes producing vastly different results.78

68. See In re Exxon Valdez, 490 F.3d at 1073.
69. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2609 (2008).
70. Id. at 2626–27.
71. Perhaps the best evidence for this statement is the Court’s footnote at the
end of the opinion that it “may well” have reached exactly the same conclusion
as a matter of due process. Id. at 2634 n.28.
72. Id. at 2624–25.
73. Id. at 2625 n.14.
74. Id. at 2624.
75. Id. at 2625.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 2625–26.
78. Id. at 2626.
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Unpredictability is fundamentally a procedural complaint. As the
Court put it,
Courts of law are concerned with fairness as consistency . . . .
Thus, a penalty should be reasonably predictable in its severity,
so that even Justice Holmes’s “bad man” can look ahead with
some ability to know what the stakes are in choosing one
course of action or another. And when the bad man’s
counterparts turn up from time to time, the penalty scheme
they face ought to threaten them with a fair probability of
suffering in like degree when they wreak like damage.79
Having armed itself with a charge to regularize punitive awards,
all that was left was to enforce that mandate here. In the Court’s view,
Exxon’s conduct did not involve any “earmarks of exceptional
blameworthiness” because it was not intentional or malicious. Nor was
it “driven primarily by a desire for gain.”80 Accordingly, the Court held
that the award should not exceed the median level of punitive awards
by any significant degree.81 It settled on a 1:1 ratio as a “fair upper limit”
for maritime cases lacking elements of exceptional blameworthiness.”82
This analysis resulted in the Court reducing the plaintiffs’ punitive
award to just over $500 million.83

III. COMPARING PUNITIVE DAMAGES TO CRIMINAL SENTENCING
Some commentators have complained that the Supreme Court’s
punitive damages jurisprudence is “markedly inconsistent” with
criminal sentencing law.84 The Court’s Exxon analysis, however,
parallels the critique and solutions of two criminal sentencing reforms:
(1) the movement toward determinate sentencing for noncapital
offenses, culminating most famously in the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines; and (2) the judicial imposition of requirements for guiding
juries’ determinations of which murderers are selected for capital
punishment. Although the Court referenced the first in passing, it did

79. Id. at 2625–27.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 2634.
84. Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at 1051 (arguing that the Court has been
“markedly inconsistent both in terms of substantive limits and procedural
requirements for these types of penalties”); see also Rachel A. Van Cleave,
Mapping Proportionality Review: Still a “Road to Nowhere,” 43 TULSA L. REV. 709,
723 (2008); James Headley, Proportionality Between Crimes, Offenses, and
Punishments, 17 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 247, 247–48 (2004).
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not even mention the second. But it may well be that the second is the
more revealing analogy.
A. Sentencing Guidelines
Prior to the enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984,
federal law did not impose any constraints on judges’ sentencing power,
with the exception of establishing (very high) maximum punishments.
Defendants convicted of felonies, therefore, frequently found themselves
subjected to sentences anywhere from zero to twenty years, or even life,
in prison. Judges could impose any length of punishment for virtually
any reason, and appellate review was essentially unavailable.
The most influential critique of this system came in 1972 from
Marvin Frankel, at the time a federal district judge. He considered “the
almost wholly unchecked and sweeping powers” judges had in the
fashioning of sentences to be “terrifying and intolerable for a society that
professes devotion to the rule of law.”85 Judge Frankel argued that
allowing judges to select any length of sentence, without legislative
guidance for “locating a particular case within any range,” was “prima
facie at war with . . . equality, objectivity, and consistency in the law.”86
In the absence of legislators at least “sketch[ing] democratically
determined” purposes of sentencing and “rudimentary” guidelines for
exercising sentencing discretion, Judge Frankel contended that the
federal sentencing system violated the Due Process Clause.87
The Supreme Court never had occasion to consider any direct due
process challenge to the discretion-laden federal sentencing system. In
1987, Congress obviated the need to do so, enacting the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines to address the problem Judge Frankel identified.
But one would hardly have known that the Court did not expressly
require Congress to revamp the federal sentencing system by reading
the Exxon opinion; the Supreme Court proceeded effectively as though
the Due Process Clause had required the creation of the Guidelines.
The Court began by asserting that the current common-law method
of assessing punitive damages closely resembles the pre-Guidelines state
of affairs respecting criminal sentencing, except that juries assessing
punitive damages typically lack even statutory maximums.88 That
reality, in the Court’s view, rendered the common-law method of
85. FRANKEL, supra note 20, at 5. For a collection and summary of similar
critiques and studies, see 6 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §
26.3(b) (3d ed. 2007–08).
86. FRANKEL, supra note 20, at 10.
87. Id. at 7–8.
88. See Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2627–28.
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assessing punitive damages intolerable.89 In the absence of any positive
law regulating maritime punitive damages,90 the Court did exactly what
Congress in the Sentencing Reform Act directed the United States
Sentencing Commission to do: it aggregated data regarding the actual
punishment typically imposed for a class of conduct, and it insisted that
all typical cases be punished in the middle of that range.91
To be sure, the Court did not expressly hold that the Due Process
Clause, as opposed to maritime law, forbids all “outlier” punitive
awards imposed under the common law system.92 But the Court
expressly built on its due process holdings in BMW and State Farm.93 It
found it “instructive” that the federal government and many states, over
the past twenty-five years, had replaced their practices of giving judges
“relatively unguided discretion to sentence within a wide range” with
systems that guide and confine judicial discretion within fairly narrow
ranges.94 It also extolled the Federal Sentencing Guidelines for their role
in “‘reduc[ing] unjustified disparities in criminal sentencing” and for
“‘reach[ing] toward the evenhandedness and neutrality that are the
distinguishing marks of any principled system of justice.’”95 It was as if
Congress’s creation of the guidelines (around the time several other
states took similar steps) formed a sort of mini “constitutional moment,”
in which the nation rethought criminal sentencing and concluded that
unjustified disparities were simply intolerable.96
The implication seems inescapable: the Court’s punitive damages
89. See id. at 2627 (“[T]his feature of happenstance is in the tension with the
function of the awards as punitive, just because of the implication of unfairness
that an eccentrically high punitive verdict carries. . . .”).
90. The Court’s strained survey of other statutes allowing punitive damages
and other kinds of punitive fines illuminated the oft-disrespected “comparable
penalties” guidepost it established in BMW. Compare BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559,
583–84 (1996) with In re Exxon Valdez 490 F.3d 1066, 1094–95 (2007) (questioning
purpose and importance of guidepost). The Court through that guidepost had
been looking not just for a point of comparison for the amount of punishment at
issue; it had been groping for some positive legislative enactment to inform its
analysis.
91. See Exxon Shipping Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2629. Justices Stevens and Ginsburg
dissented because they thought it was unwise for the Court to take this
legislative-style approach. They would have restricted their review, in the
absence of any positive law on the subject, to whether the award amounted to an
abuse of discretion. See Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2635–36 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 2639 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
92. Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2610.
93. See id. at 2622, 2625–26.
94. Id. at 2628.
95. Id. at 2627 (quoting Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996)).
96. See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998) (setting
forth theory of “constitutional moments”).
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jurisprudence in general (not just within the realm of maritime law) is
aimed at superimposing some minimum level of law on what the Court
perceives to be an unjustifiably lawless system. Even assuming that the
Court would not feel free to impose quite as strict limits on unstructured
state systems as the federal maritime system,97 the same reasoning
infuses both lines of cases. The Due Process Clause—indeed, the rule of
law itself—requires civil as well as criminal punishment to be
regularized.98
This conclusion might seem odd in light of the fact that Justice
Breyer, an architect of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Court’s
chief defender of the Guidelines, dissented from the result in Exxon. But
Justice Breyer’s dissent actually confirms the Court’s orientation. Justice
Breyer accepted the majority’s premise that, as he put it, “there is a need,
grounded in the rule of law itself, to assure that punitive damages are
awarded according to meaningful standards that will provide notice of
how harshly certain acts will be punished and that will help to assure
the uniform treatment of similarly situated persons.”99 He simply
disagreed on how to apply that premise. In contrast to the majority,
Justice Breyer thought that Exxon’s conduct was not a “mine-run case of
reckless behavior.”100 Thus, in the parlance of the Guidelines, he thought
that the lower courts were warranted in allowing an “upward
departure” in the case.101
97. This seems to be a safe assumption. The Court described its maritime
analysis in Exxon as “more rigorous” than its constitutional jurisprudence. 128 S.
Ct. at 2629.
98. The Court struck a similar theme (though less explicitly) in the last
punitive damages decision it issued prior to Exxon. In Philip Morris USA v.
Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057 (2007), the Court explicitly restricted its focus to
“procedural limitations” on punitive awards and issued limitations on juries’
ability to consider defendants’ actions against nonparties in assessing punitive
damages. The Court described this limitation as necessary “to avoid an arbitrary
determination of an award’s amount.” Id. at 1062. Furthermore, some lower
courts prior to Exxon already had conceptualized the due process line of cases as
focusing on regularization. See Thomas v. iStar Financial, Inc., 508 F. Supp. 2d
252, 263 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (finding award excessive because “the jury’s award is
not in line with the punitive damages awarded in similar cases by this Court or
other courts in this Circuit”); Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 150 v. Lowe
Excavating Co., 870 N.E.2d 303, 322–23 (Ill. 2006) (“In our estimation, the best
way to determine whether a given ratio is appropriate is to compare it to
punitive damages awards in other, similar cases.”).
99. Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2640 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (citing BMW v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 587 (1996) (Breyer, J.,
concurring)).
100. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
101. Justice Breyer’s increased willingness to defer to the district court’s
assessment of the defendant’s conduct as unusually reprehensible was in
keeping with his view in the criminal sentencing realm that appellate judges
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Modern Capital Punishment Law

The Supreme Court’s Exxon analysis also bears a strong
resemblance to its treatment of capital punishment laws a generation
ago. In 1972—the same year in which Judge Frankel issued his stinging
critique of the federal sentencing system—the Court in Furman v.
Georgia102 confronted the prevailing system in the states for imposing
capital punishment.103 Under this system, statutes permitted the death
penalty for murder and sometimes other serious crimes such as rape or
kidnapping.104 Yet state law did not require death to be imposed in any
case.105 Instead, the law left it to judges or juries to decide which
offenders, if any, should be sentenced to death.106 And as it turned out,
those decision-makers sentenced only a small fraction of offenders to
death.
Faced with the infrequency of death sentences and, as Justice White
famously put it, “no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in
which [capital punishment] is imposed from the many cases in which it
is not,”107 the Court held this sentencing system violated the Eighth
Amendment. The Court emphatically did not hold that capital
punishment itself was always constitutionally excessive punishment;108
just four years later, in fact, it explicitly upheld the practice as applied to
murder.109 But the Furman Court held that the Eighth Amendment does
not tolerate such harsh punishment to be “wantonly and freakishly
imposed.”110 “[W]here discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a
matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be
taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so

should defer to district judges’ front-line assessments of defendants’ conduct.
See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises
Upon Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 6–7; United States v. Mendez-Colon,
15 F.3d 188, 190–91 (1st Cir. 1994) (Breyer, C.J.) ; United States v. Diaz-Villafane,
874 F.2d 43, 49–52 (1st Cir. 1994) (Breyer, J., joining opinion of Selya, J.).
102. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
103. See id.
104. Id. at 341 (Marshall, J., concurring).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 311 (White, J., concurring).
107. Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring); see also id. at 309–10 (Stewart, J.,
concurring).
108. Id. at 310–11 (White, J., concurring).
109. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
110. Furman, 408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring). There was no majority
opinion in Furman, so the Court’s “holding” consisted of the narrowest grounds
that garnered a majority: the opinions of Justices Stewart and White. See id. at
375.
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as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.”111
Indeed, if state law does not channel such discretion, the Constitution
forbids capital punishment even for the most atrocious murders.112
States have responded to Furman and its progeny by codifying
various “aggravating factors” designed to distinguish typical murders
from those deserving of the possibility of capital punishment.113 And by
operation of the Sixth Amendment’s jury trial clause, juries must find
such facts beyond a reasonable doubt.114
Although the Exxon Court never referred to the Furman line of
cases, Exxon’s analysis bears obvious parallels to Furman’s desire to
regularize punishment. In fact, in at least one respect, Furman should
have been a more obvious parallel than the sentencing guidelines: the
Furman Court, like the Exxon Court, was expressly concerned with
placing boundless discretion in the hands of juries, whereas the
sentencing guidelines movement targeted excessive judicial discretion.
Placing undue discretion in the hands of juries raises concerns regarding
arbitrariness in a few particularly acute ways.
First, juries are one-off enterprises. It is in many ways
advantageous to use a collection of citizens unjaded by the daily grind
of courtroom litigation to pass judgment in individual cases. But juries
generally are unable (at least without any legal guidance) to compare a
case they are seeing to other cases like it and to decide whether a set of
facts is particularly egregious.115 This disability may be even more

111. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 427 (1980) (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at
189) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.). The Court has restricted
capital punishment with respect to crimes against individuals to cases in which a
homicide occurs. See infra at note 191 and accompanying text.
112. See Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 363 (1988) (“reject[ing] the
submission that a particular set of facts surrounding a murder, however
shocking they might be, [a]re enough in themselves, and without some
narrowing principle to apply to [the] facts, to warrant imposition of the death
penalty”).
113. See, e.g., Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 971–72 (1994). As the Court
has explained, aggravating circumstances “may be contained in the definition of
the crime or in a separate sentencing factor (or both).” Id. at 972. One other
possible response to a concern over inconsistency in punishment, of course, is to
make the punishment at issue mandatory. But the Court has held that because of
the unique nature of the death penalty, a legislature cannot make its imposition
mandatory for murder or any other basic crime. See Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976). Save possibly “the rarest kind of capital case,” the
jury must be given the opportunity to exercise mercy and to spare the defendant
capital punishment. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604–05 (1978).
114. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
115. See, e.g., Romero, supra note 24, at 155; Roselle L. Wissler et al., Instructing
Jurors on General Damages in Personal Injury Cases: Problems and Possibilities, 6
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 712, 718 (2000).
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pronounced in the realm of corporate misconduct, in which identifiable
markers of especially reprehensible conduct may be more elusive than
in the context of homicides.116
Second, even insofar as juries can be educated through evidence
regarding typical kinds of torts or murders, juries are simply not trained,
as judges are, to seek and to value legal consistency.117 While judges are
likely to give substantial consideration in sentencing to treating like
offenders similarly (at least like offenders that they personally sentence),
juries may be more willing to deviate from the norm if they perceive the
norm to be off kilter. Indeed, that is part of the reason we have juries, at
least with respect to mitigation in the criminal context. For centuries, we
have depended on juries to invoke their nullification power when the
letter of the law dictates what they believe to be unjust punishment.118
Given the power, as Judge Friendly once put it, to issue verdicts “in the
teeth of both law and facts . . . to prevent punishment from getting out
of line with the crime,”119 there is reason at least to worry that juries will
on occasion do the same thing for the opposite reason—that is, issue
verdicts that disregard the law to deliver extra punishment that they
believe is appropriate.120
116. See infra notes 200–94 and accompanying text.
117. See, e.g., Sunstein et al., supra note 11.
118. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 304 (2004) (describing jury’s role
as “circuitbreaker in the State’s machinery of justice”); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 293 (1976) (discussing jury’s historic role of returning
noncapital verdicts notwithstanding the evidence in order to avoid mandatory
death sentences that followed from convictions for certain crimes).
119. United States v. Maybury, 274 F.2d 899, 902 (2d Cir. 1960).
120. See Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An
Empirical Study, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 743 (2002) (studying actual cases in which
judges or juries awarded punitive damages and finding that while each award
punitive damages at similar rates and in overall similar amounts, jury awards
produce a greater spread and rare outliers). Following the Exxon verdict, Exxon
funded a number of studies designed to show—and that purportedly do show—
that different juries given the same case are prone to render wildly different
punitive judgments. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES:
HOW JURIES DECIDE (University of Chicago Press 2002); David Schkade et al.,
Empirical Study: Deliberating About Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 COLUM. L. REV.
1139 (2000); Hastie, et al., Juror Judgments in Civil Cases: Effects of Plaintiff’s
Requests and Plaintiff’s Identity on Punitive Damages Awards, 23 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 445 (1999); Sunstein et al., supra note 11. For background on how this
body of work came into being, see William R. Freudenberg, Seeding Science,
Courting Conclusions: Reexamining the Intersection of Science, Corporate Cash, and the
Law, 20 SOC. F. 3, 13–19 (2005). Some scholars dispute the value of this research,
which is based on mock juries given hypothetical fact patterns. See, e.g., Neil
Vidmar, Experimental Simulations and Tort Reform, Avoidance, Error, and
Overreaching in Sunstein et al.’s Punitive Damages, 53 EMORY L.J. 1359 (2004); Neal
Feigenson, Can Tort Juries Punish Competently? 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 239 (2002)
(Book Review); Steven Graber, Punitive Damages and Deterrence of Efficiency-
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Third, juries may be more susceptible than judges to bias. Juries
deliberate in private and are by definition immune from any kind of
systematic study of their decision making across cases. Thus, even
before Exxon, the Court openly worried about the possibility that
leaving juries with wide discretion “creates the potential that juries will
use their verdicts to express biases against big businesses, particularly
those without strong local presences.”121 This worry echoes the Justices’
repeated concern in the Furman line of cases that affording unguided
discretion to juries poses “an unacceptable risk that a sentence will
succumb to either overt or subtle racial impulses or appeals.”122 While
legal restrictions on discretion cannot stamp out the potential for
discriminatory punishments, such restrictions obviously can keep such
impulses in check and limit their effects.
Lest there be any doubt regarding the strength of the parallel here,
the dissents in punitive damages cases―like Justice Breyer’s dissent in
Exxon respecting the parallel to the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines123―prove the point. The most vocal dissenter from the
punitive damages cases invoking the Due Process Clause to invalidate
large awards has been Justice Scalia, the same justice who, more than
anyone else on the Court, has championed the role of juries in delivering
individualized justice.124 It is also he, more than anyone else on the
Court, who continually has criticized the Furman line of jurisprudence as

Promoting Analysis: A Problem Without a Solution?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1809 (2000);
Robert J. MacCoun, Epistemological Dilemmas in the Assessment of Legal Decision
Making, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 723 (1999). My point here is not to choose sides
in this empirical debate, but rather to explain theoretically why the Court might
be particularly concerned—whether justified or not—with granting juries
unbounded discretion to assign punitive damages.
121. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 417 (2003)
(quoting Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 432 (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting)). Some research indicates that juries are not actually biased against
business. See VALERIE HANS, BUSINESS ON TRIAL, ch. 5–7 (Yale University Press
2000). As with claims that juries are more likely than judges to produce outlier
awards, I do not here draw any empirical conclusion in this respect.
122. Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 992 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting);
see also Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 496–97 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(“For 20 years, we have acknowledged the relationship between unguided jury
discretion and the danger of discriminatory sentencing―a danger we have held
to be inconsistent with the Eighth Amendment.”); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238, 249–51 (Douglas, J., concurring); Id. at 364 (Marshall, J., concurring).
123. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2608 (2008).
124. See, e.g., Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); Ring v. Arizona, 536
U.S. 584, 610–13 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S.
466, 498–500 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 30–
40 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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illegitimate and unnecessary.125 Unlike Justice Breyer, Justice Scalia sees
little need for legislative regularization (or, as he has put it, a
“bureaucratic realm of perfect equity”).126 Rather, Justice Scalia believes
it is better to let “the people” do as they see fit based on the facts of
particular cases. But while Justice Scalia has largely been successful in
persuading a majority of the Court to involve juries in decision making
that leads to punishment,127 he has not persuaded a majority to leave the
question to juries’ discretion.

IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONALLY REGULARIZING
PUNISHMENT
The convergence between punitive damages jurisprudence and
criminal sentencing principles has significant implications. Most
importantly, the Supreme Court’s robust body of criminal sentencing
jurisprudence allows us to peek into the future and to predict ways in
which the Court’s more nascent venture into regulating punitive
damages is likely to―or at least should―settle out. The Supreme Court
regulates criminal sentencing almost exclusively on procedural grounds;
among other things, defendants must have fair notice of potential
penalties,128 juries must be instructed in certain ways,129 and juries
instead of courts must be asked to make certain kinds of factual
determinations.130 But as long as a legislative body has sorted types of
125. See, e.g., Ring, 536 U.S. at 610–13; Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 659–70
(1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
126. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498–99 (Scalia, J., concurring).
127. See Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270 (2007); United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); Ring v.
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498–500.
128. See, e.g., Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 478 (defendant must be able to “predict
with certainty from the face of a felony indictment” the maximum permissible
punishment); United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39 (1994) (defendant’s
sentence may not be increased pursuant to ambiguous statute because
defendants must have clear and unambiguous notice of potential punishments);
Bifulco v. United States, 447 U.S. 381 (1980); Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398
(1980); Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6 (1978); see also Bouie v. City of
Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 354 (1964) (due process prohibits state court from
construing a criminal statute in an “unexpected and indefensible” way “by
reference to the law which has been expressed prior to the conduct at issue”).
129. See, e.g., Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994) (holding juries in
capital cases in which prosecutors seek a death sentence on the basis of future
dangerousness must be instructed regarding the potential for parole if defendant
is sentenced to life imprisonment).
130. See, e.g., Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477 (holding juries must find any fact other
than a prior conviction that subjects a defendant to heightened punishment);
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (holding the same in the context of
non-advisory sentencing guidelines regimes).
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misconduct into some kind of hierarchy and established maximum
punishments, a sentencing judge or jury that follows proper procedures
in imposing a particular sentence enjoys nearly absolute deference from
the Court for its case-specific decisions. If anything, this deference
should be even more pronounced when legislative determinations
respecting punitive damages supply frameworks for jury verdicts.
Conversely, the Court’s application of a rigorous predictability
requirement to punitive damages has at least one important implication
for criminal sentencing law: it indicates that a number of state
sentencing systems resembling the pre-Guidelines federal system are
now vulnerable to constitutional attack.
A. Punitive Damages
Now that the Court has indicated that its punitive damages
jurisprudence is motivated by a concern for protecting defendants from
unpredictable punitive damages in the same way defendants should be
protected from unpredictable criminal punishment, any theoretical
constructs that insulate criminal sentences from substantive
constitutional infirmity should likewise insulate punitive damages from
such infirmity. I will focus here on three such constructs and apply them
to punitive damages. First, despite the Eighth Amendment’s explicit
invitation for courts to disallow “cruel and unusual punishments,” the
Court treats setting criminal punishments as an almost purely legislative
task and defers almost completely to legislative and other deliberative
policymaking actors that establish punishment regimes in democratic
ways. The Court’s punitive damages jurisprudence, contrary to its
surface impressions, invites the same kind of dynamic. Second, once a
deliberative body has enacted positive criminal sentencing law, the
Court allows state and local governments to pursue a wide array of
interests or policy goals through widely divergent sentencing systems.
The same should be true with respect to punitive damages. Third, as
long as a deliberative body has enacted positive law establishing
quantified levels of criminal punishment, the Court allows states to
impose punishment at almost any level it wishes. The same should be
true with respect to punitive damages, even in cases involving
substantial compensatory damages, in which the Court has suggested
the Due Process Clause most closely regulates the size of punitive
awards.131

131. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2634 n.28 (2008); State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 425 (2003).
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1. Encouraging Democratic Development of Law
The Court’s criminal sentencing jurisprudence starts from the
premise that legislatures have the “primary responsibility for making
the difficult policy choices that underlie any criminal sentencing
scheme.”132 Accordingly, a foremost goal of this jurisprudence seems to
be to push legislatures to make such policy choices, instead of leaving
them to the court system. This observation is true not just in terms of
setting maximum punishments but also in terms of establishing
guidelines for sorting individual cases within the resulting sentencing
ranges.133 Once a legislature sets a statutory level of punishment through
the democratic process, the Court defers to it as long as the legislature
had a “reasonable basis” for believing that it would “advance the goals
of [the state’s] criminal justice system in any substantial way.”134 The
Court takes the same approach with respect to civil and criminal fines,
which resemble punitive damages even more than traditional criminal
punishments.135
This preference and respect for statutory law in the realm of
sentencing and fines—a preference captured to a significant degree in
Justice Breyer’s concept of “active liberty”136—is part of a larger theme in
the Court’s jurisprudence: the Court sometimes issues constitutional
rulings that appear to be substantive prohibitions but that actually are
simply entreaties for legislative engagement. The Court, for example,
has issued decisions in the context of national security that do not so
much foreclose governmental action as they force Congress to step into

132. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28 (2003).
133. Justice White’s closing words in Furman speak particularly directly to
this issue: “In this respect, I add only that past and present legislative judgment
with respect to the death penalty loses much of its force when viewed in light of
the recurring practice of delegating sentencing authority to the jury and the fact
that a jury, in its own discretion and without violating its trust or any statutory
policy, may refuse to impose the death penalty no matter what the
circumstances of the crime. Legislative ‘policy’ is thus necessarily defined not by
what is legislatively authorized but by what juries and judges do in exercising
the discretion so regularly conferred upon them. In my judgment what was done
in these cases violated the Eighth Amendment.” 408 U.S. 238, 314 (1972) (White,
J., concurring).
134. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 28 (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 297 n.22
(1983)). The Court has similarly stated in the context of capital punishment that
“the sanction imposed cannot be so totally without penological justification that
it results in the gratuitous infliction of suffering.” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
183 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.).
135. See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334–37 (1998) (emphasizing
that judgments about appropriate size of fines “belong in the first instance to the
legislature” and that fines violate the Constitution only if “grossly
disproportional” to the conduct at issue).
136. See generally STEPHEN G. BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY (Vintage 2005).
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policymaking debates concerning these delicate matters.137 The Court
even has gone so far on occasion as to invoke the Constitution to
invalidate laws in this realm, while expressly reserving the question of
whether the very same laws would be constitutional if reenacted in a
more carefully considered manner. In Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, for
instance, the Court invalidated federal regulations depriving aliens of
the ability to work in federal service positions.138 The Court nevertheless
explained that such discriminatory action might be valid if Congress
explicitly determined after “a considered evaluation” that it was
necessary.139 The Court has taken similar actions in other areas,
disallowing a death sentence for a fifteen year old140 and invalidating a
felon disenfranchisement law.141 Guido Calabresi describes such rulings
as constitutionally requiring legislatures “to take a ‘second look’ with
the eyes of the people on it.”142
The problem with the current state of affairs with respect to
punitive damages is that there is little to no democratically enacted
law.143 Most states lack even a single statute on the books allowing
punitive damages in tort cases, much less capping punitive exposure by
means of a maximum ratio or dollar amount.144 And almost all states
137. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 636 (2006) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (defending decision holding that the President could not unilaterally
establish rules governing detainees in Guantanamo Bay because “[t]he
Constitution places its faith in [the] democratic means” of “consultation with
Congress”); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (holding that due process
requires giving people detained as “enemy combatants” an opportunity to prove
that they are being wrongfully detained); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S.
88, 115–16 (1976) (invalidating federal regulations depriving aliens of the ability
to work in federal service positions because nothing indicated the President or
Congress had given the matter “a considered evaluation”).
138. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
139. Id. at 115.
140. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 857 (1988) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (providing the fifth vote to hold that punishment violated the
Eighth Amendment simply because it was unclear whether the legislature
intended to make such punishment available).
141. Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985) (holding that a felon
disenfranchisement law enacted for racially discriminatory reasons was invalid,
even though the Constitution allows such disenfranchisement as a general
matter).
142. Guido Calabresi, Foreword: Antidiscrimination and Constitutional
Accountability (What the Bork-Brennan Debate Ignores), 105 HARV. L. REV. 80, 104
(1991).
143. In this respect, I agree with Leo Romero’s observation that “[t]he critical
difference between the Court’s approaches in reviewing punitive damages and
criminal sentences for excessiveness is the presence of legislative limits on
criminal punishment and the absence of legislative limits on punitive damages
awards.” Romero, supra note 24, at 140.
144. Rustad, supra note 32, at 1370–1417 (fifty-state survey).
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lack legislation establishing any kind of hierarchy of fault within the
realm of conduct subject to punitive damages.145 Finally, in contrast even
to excessively discretionary sentencing regimes the Court has criticized,
decisions to seek punitive damages are typically made by private parties
instead of politically accountable public officials.146
The Supreme Court seems to think a “second look” is in order. In
the meantime, this absence of positive law—and of demonstrable
democratic support for extremely large punitive awards—exposes the
common-law system not only to charges of unpredictability,147 but also
to the attack that it “is at odds with the central democratic principle that
policy questions are decided by the people’s elected representatives,”
not by randomly selected juries.148 Extremely large punitive awards
embody and often effectuate judgments concerning the social utility of
conduct.149 Consequently, as Judge Alex Kozinski has argued, such
judgments should be made by legislatures. Juries should do no more
than sort out factual controversies and apply preexisting legislative
judgments to particular cases.150
Of course, one could respond that in a democracy in which
corporate interests often have an inordinate effect on—if not an outright
stranglehold on—the legislative process, it is appropriate (or even
necessary) for juries to be able to regulate corporations free and clear of
legislation. Legislators with fundraising and other financial concerns,
the argument goes, are simply too beholden to corporate interests to be
trusted to expose them to the level of punishment they deserve and that
is socially desirable.
There are obvious responses to this counterargument, not the least
of which is that consumers and other potential plaintiffs actually are
fairly well-represented in the legislative process.151 But the important

145. See id. at 1348–49.
146. See Pamela S. Karlan, “Pricking the Lines”: The Due Process Clause, Punitive
Damages, and Criminal Punishment, 88 MINN. L. REV. 880, 919 (2004).
147. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
148. Alex Kozinski, The Case of Punitive Damages v. Democracy, WALL ST. J., Jan.
19, 1995, A18; see also Romero, supra note 24 at 116 (“Punitive damages . . .
punish without a societal judgment about proportionality in the many states that
have no legislatively imposed limits.”).
149. See, e.g., Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 355 (2007) (noting
“the risk that punitive damages awards can, in practice, impose one State’s (or
one jury’s) policies (e.g., banning cigarettes) upon other States”).
150. See Kozinski, supra note 148.
151. See, e.g., Robert A. Kagan, How Much Do Conservative Tort Tales Matter?,
31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 711, 714 (2006) (noting that “the American Trial Lawyers
Association (ATLA) and its state-level affiliates have devoted huge campaign
contributions and considerable lobbying skill to fight tort reform bills in state
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point for present purposes is that the Supreme Court clearly has come
down on the side of preferring legislation. This is so even though the
Court has held in other contexts that there is no difference between state
legislation and what we have here (at least when state courts uphold
punitive verdicts): state-court explications of state law and policy.152 The
Court, in other words, has implicitly rejected the argument that “[g]iven
the widespread adoption of legislative schemes to limit the amount of
punitive damages awards, any state without such a scheme has, in
effect, an implicit legislative endorsement of that state’s common-law
scheme for determining the amount of punitive damages.”153
Similarly, the Court has clearly rejected the claim of some
commentators that the “solution” to any concerns about unpredictability
in punitive awards is simply to “provide detailed written instructions”
to juries.154 Such instructions, some commentators argued before Exxon,
adequately guide a jury’s consideration of a defendant’s conduct and the
proper relationship between the underlying harm and any punitive
award.155 But the jury in Exxon received such instructions. Not only was
the jury (somewhat presciently) instructed on the “very same concepts”
later crystallized in the Supreme Court’s due process cases, but it also
was given “unusually detailed” guidance for calibrating any punitive
award to the level of Exxon’s wrongdoing.156
The jury in Exxon was told, for instance, that it could consider: (1)
whether corporate policy contributed to, or actually prescribed, the
wrongdoing; (2) whether corporate policy makers and people with
significant duties and responsibilities, or just low-level employees,
participated in the wrongdoing; (3) whether several employees or just a
limited number played roles in the misconduct; (4) whether Exxon had
taken steps to prevent recurrence of the wrongdoing; (5) whether

legislatures and Congress,” and that “ATLA often has been effective in blocking
or watering down conservative tort reform bills”).
152. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 364 (2003) (holding that the state
supreme court’s approval of jury instructions “is a ruling on a question of state
law that is binding on us as though the precise words had been written” into a
state statute) (quoting Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949)).
153. F. Patrick Hubbard, Substantive Due Process Limits on Punitive Damages
Awards: “Morals Without Technique?”, 60 FLA. L. REV. 349, 385 (2008) (internal
citation omitted).
154. Neil Vidmar & Matthew W. Wolfe, Fairness Through Guidance: Jury
Instructions on Punitive Damages After Philip Morris v. Williams, 2 CHARLESTON L.
REV. 307, 318–24 (2008). But see Romero, supra note 24, at 156 (arguing that jury
instructions are inadequate without legislative cap).
155. Vidmar, supra note 154, at 318–24.
156. In re the Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1080 (D. Alaska 2004). See
Jury instructions 30, 35, 36, and 38, reprinted in App. to Brief for Respondents
17a–21a, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605 (2008).
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criminal and civil fines Exxon had already paid, coupled with its cleanup costs, mitigated the need for any award that otherwise would be
proper; (6) whether the social condemnation Exxon had suffered
mitigated the need for any punitive award; and (7) whether a punitive
award might be borne by Exxon shareholders.157 It is not easy to think of
additional guidance the district court could have given the jury to aid it
in assessing the relative need to punish and deter Exxon’s
wrongdoing.158
But the “law” in the Exxon jury instructions came from the court
and the parties, not from Congress. Unlike a capital prosecution or a
structured criminal sentencing regime, there was no congressionally
established structure within which the jury and trial judge were
required to exercise their discretion. There was no quantified starting
point to use considering all of the potentially aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, and there was no stratified range of potential misdeeds
in which they might have placed Exxon’s conduct. Hence, the Court
treated the jury’s verdict and the district judge’s approval of it as
determinations that did not incorporate or reflect any democratically
established policy determinations. In order to trigger the Court’s
practice in its criminal sentencing jurisprudence of deferring to policy
determinations concerning how best to punish misconduct, a
legislature—not a court or parties—must set the policy guidelines at
issue.
2. Pursuing Varied State Interests
Although it is now plain that the Court intends to view skeptically
any punitive award rendered under a pure common law system, the flip
side of the Court’s preference for legislatively regularizing punishment
should mean that it will relax its skepticism when Congress or a state
legislature has enacted positive law allowing and governing the
punitive award at issue. Indeed, it appears that the Court should afford
extreme deference to such legislative judgments. This deference should

157. Id.
158. One commentator has suggested that juries could be instructed
regarding typical awards in similar cases as a way of giving them benchmarks
for awarding punitive damages. Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Determining Punitive
Damages: Empirical Insights and Implications for Reform, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 103, 197–
99 (2002). But see Cass R. Sunstein et al., supra note 120 (arguing that such
instructions would help reduce, but would not cure, the problem of
arbitrariness). Regardless of whether that is feasible in a typical tort case
involving reprehensible conduct, it was not an option in Exxon, for the oil spill
had no real parallel. At any rate, it is difficult to imagine evidence or an
instruction like this satisfying the Court in the absence of any legislative
imprimatur of the judgments in “similar” cases.
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begin with an explicit recognition that legislatures may seek to further a
broad array of governmental interests through permitting punitive
damages.
In the realm of criminal sentencing, the Court has emphasized that:
The Constitution does not mandate adoption of any one
penological theory. A sentence can have a variety of
justifications, such as incapacitation, deterrence, retribution, or
rehabilitation. . . . Selecting the sentencing rationales is
generally a policy choice to be made by state legislatures, not
federal courts.159
Accordingly, although deterrence and retribution are the most
common governmental interests furthered by criminal sentencing, the
Court readily deferred in Ewing v. California to the California
Legislature’s judgment that protecting the public safety requires
“incapacitating” those with two prior serious violent felony convictions
who commit even low-level felonies.160 The Court similarly deferred in
Harmelin v. Michigan to the Michigan Legislature’s determination that
sentences should be tailored particularly to threats it believed that the
possession of large amounts of drugs pose to society.161
The Supreme Court also appears to readily accept legislative policy
goals supporting other systems of awarding non-compensatory
damages. In Exxon, for instance, the Court noted without an ounce of
skepticism that “Congress devised the treble damages remedy for
private antitrust actions with an eye to supplementing official
enforcement by inducing private litigation, which might otherwise have
been too rare if nothing but compensatory damages were available at
the end of the day.”162 States frequently defend treble damages in

159. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003) (internal citations omitted); see
also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 998 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment) (“the responsibility for making these
fundamental choices and implementing them lies with the legislature”); Gore v.
United States, 357 U.S. 386, 393 (1958) (“Whatever views may be entertained
regarding severity of punishment, whether one believes in its efficacy or its
futility, [. . .] these are peculiarly questions of legislative policy”).
160. 538 U.S. at 25; see also id. at 29 (holding that a court must “accord proper
deference to the policy judgments that find expression in the legislature’s choice
of sanctions”).
161. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1003 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
162. 128 S. Ct. at 2632; see generally Am. Soc’y of Mech. Eng. v. Hydrolevel
Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 575 (1982) (reciting various justifications for antitrust treble
damages); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 344 (1979) (focusing on private
litigation-enhancing role).
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consumer protection cases on a similar basis.163 The Court has never
questioned state legislatures’ ability to pursue this private litigationenhancing goal through quasi-punishment in the form of damages over
and above compensatory judgments.
What is more, the Court already has taken a step in the realm of
punitive damages toward broadly deferring to various state interests. In
BMW of North America v. Gore, the Court started from the premise that
“the federal excessiveness inquiry appropriately begins with an
identification of the state interests that a punitive award is designed to
serve.”164 Yet, because the Alabama Legislature had not enacted any
legislation allowing or regulating the punitive award there, the Court
did not have any occasion to consider any state interest beyond the
generalized notions—which it accepted—that “[p]unitive damages may
properly be imposed to further a State’s legitimate interests in punishing
unlawful conduct and deterring its repetition.”165
There is no reason to think that the Court would not be equally
deferential to a state’s desire to accomplish something else through a
punitive remedy.166 Exxon illustrates how such a situation might arise.
There, the plaintiffs sought to justify their multi-billion dollar punitive
award in part on the ground that it provided quasi-compensation for
certain harms that are not directly actionable under maritime law.167
Although the quasi-compensatory function of punitive awards has
163. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 93A, § 11 (2002); TEX. BUS. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(1) (2002); Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682, 690
(Tex. 1980) (finding the Texas Legislature provided for treble damages “so that
consumers will have incentive to pursue their claims”).
164. BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996).
165. Id.
166. Catherine Sharkey makes a similar point in arguing that states have the
power to re-conceptualize punitive damages as “societal damages” and that, if
they did, this approach “would seem to survive the retributive-punishmentfocused due process constraints of State Farm.” Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive
Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L. J. 347, 401 (2003); see also id. at 353–54.
167. See Brief for Respondents 61–63, Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct.
2605 (2008). Punitive awards historically served such a quasi-compensatory
function. Indeed, “the whole [common law] doctrine of punitory or exemplary
damages has its foundation in a failure to recognize as elements upon which
compensation may be given many things which ought to be classed as injuries
entitling the injured person to compensation.” Stuart v. Western Union Tel. Co.,
66 Tex. 580, 586 (1885); see also Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group, 532
U.S. 424, 437 n.11 (2001); Kenneth Redden, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 2.2 (The Michie
Co. 1980) (referencing this history). Common law cases are legion in which
punitive damages were allowed because the defendant’s conduct caused
injuries, most often mental anguish and inexact consequential harm, for which
plaintiffs could not recover compensatory damages. See, e.g., Fay v. Parker, 53
N.H. 342, 382–84 (1872); McNamara v. King, 7 Ill. 432, 436 (1845); Brown v.
Swinefeld, 44 Wis. 282, 286–89 (1878).
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largely (though not entirely) disappeared from modern tort systems,168 it
arguably remains important in maritime law. Through a limitation on
the doctrine of foreseeability, maritime law forbids tort plaintiffs from
recovering certain economically remote and all intangible (or
psychological) injuries that are recoverable in other tort systems.169 The
upshot of maritime law’s limited availability of compensatory damages
meant that hundreds of millions, if not billions, of dollars of harm were
unaccounted for in the Exxon plaintiffs’ compensatory recoveries.170

168. See Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 437 n.11 (“[A]s the types of compensatory
damages available to plaintiffs have broadened” to include such things as pain
and suffering,” the theory behind punitive damages has shifted toward a more
purely punitive . . . understanding.” (internal citations omitted)); see also State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) (noting that two
plaintiffs recovered $500,000 each in compensatory damages under Utah tort
law for emotional distress related to eighteen months of uncertainty over
whether their insurance claim would be paid). Michigan law continues to
provide that punitive damages are strictly compensatory in character, their
purpose being to compensate plaintiffs in cases of malicious or wanton conduct
for their humiliation, outrage, or indignity. See Veselenak v. Smith, 327 N.W.2d
261, 264–65 (Mich. 1982); Bailey v. Graves, 309 N.W.2d 166, 169 (Mich. 1969);
Joba Constr. Co. v. Burns & Roe, Inc., 329 N.W.2d 760, 773 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
In Connecticut, the sole purpose of punitive damages remains quasicompensatory, although they are intended to compensate plaintiffs for litigation
expenses, not for intangible or otherwise uncompensable harm. See Triangle
Sheet Metal Works, Inc. v. Silver, 222 A.2d 220, 225 (Conn. 1966); DeSantis v.
Piccadilly Land Corp., 487 A.2d 1110, 1113 (Conn. App. 1985).
169. See Robins Dry Dock & Repair v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927); Getty Ref. &
Mktg. Co. v. MT FADI B, 766 F.2d 829, 833 (3rd Cir. 1985); Louisiana ex rel.
Guste v. M/V Testabank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1035 (5th Cir. 1985) (Wisdom, J.,
dissenting).
170. Commercial fishermen, for instance, were unable to recover for the
devaluation in their fishing permits to the tune of tens of thousands of dollars
per permit. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Airport Depot Diner, 120 F.3d 166, 167 n.3
(9th Cir. 1997); Brief for Amici Curiae of Sociologists, Psychologists, and Law
and Economics Scholars in Support of Respondents [hereinafter “Social Science
Amicus Brief”] 5–6. Other fishermen were unable to recover for “price
diminishment in fisheries that were not oiled” or “diminution of market value
owing to fear or stigma.” Exxon Shipping, 120 F.3d at 167 n.3. Landowners whose
land was not oiled were left uncompensated for reductions in their land’s value.
Id. The tourist industry was unable to recover for the loss of tens of millions in
revenue when would-be visitors stayed home after the spill. Social Science
Amicus Brief, at 4–5. Perhaps most significantly, residents across the region were
unable to recover for any of their profound emotional and psychological harms.
See In re the Exxon Valdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1094 (D. Alaska 2004) (noting
that “the social fabric of Prince William Sound and Lower Cook Inlet was torn
apart,” producing a high incidence of severe depression, post-traumatic stress
disorder, and generalized anxiety disorder among those whose lives depended
on harvesting the resources of the Sound”). The spill exacted an especially
severe psychological toll on Alaska Natives. For these individuals, “subsistence
fishing is not merely a way to feed their families but an important part of their
culture.” Id. at 1078.
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The Court brushed aside the plaintiffs’ argument for quasicompensation in a footnote. It refused to consider seriously whether a
punitive award may serve such purposes because “the jury instructions
in this case did not allow the jury to set punitive damages on the basis of
any such consideration.”171 However, it is hard to believe that the Court
would disallow a considered legislative policy of allowing plaintiffs to
seek punitive damages as quasi-compensation. While some scholars
have argued that plaintiffs should not be able to recover money for
actual harm through punitive damages,172 many law-and-economics
experts have explained that allowing punitive damages in cases of
extreme misconduct “can ensure that a wrongdoer bears all the costs of
its actions, and is thus appropriately deterred from causing harm.”173
Awarding damages under such circumstances, in other words, can force
wrongdoers to internalize the full range of consequences of their
reprehensible conduct, much in the same way that the Michigan law in
Harmelin sought to force people caught possessing large amounts of
drugs to account for the full societal consequences of their actions.174
States likewise should be able to pursue more specifically targeted
state interests though punitive awards. Again, the facts of Exxon provide
an apt illustration. In its simplest terms, Exxon was a drunk driving
case—or, more precisely, a case about a company’s failure to prevent a
known alcoholic from driving a supertanker. While the Court did not
dwell on the precise nature of the company’s recklessness, it is
noteworthy that some of the states that have enacted legislative caps
suspend them in cases involving intoxication.175 Surely this policy
decision is worthy of deference. The Supreme Court has stated in other
contexts—for example, in the course of upholding state laws
171. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2633 n.27 (2008). The
pertinent instructions identified the purposes of punitive damages as “to punish
a wrongdoer for extraordinary misconduct” and “to warn defendants and others
and to deter them from doing the same.” Id. (quoting jury instruction 21).
172. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic
Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 939 (1998).
173. Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 F.3d 236, 243 (2d Cir. 2000) (Calabresi,
J., concurring); see also Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d 33, 34 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting
that “punitive damages are necessary . . . to make sure that tortious conduct is
not underdeterred, as it might be if compensatory damages fell short of the
actual injury inflicted by the tort”); Thomas Galligan, Jr., Augmented Awards: The
Efficient Evolution of Punitive Damages, 51 LA. L. REV. 3, 12–13, 48–49 (1990).
174. Another way in which a state might seek to allow quasi-compensation,
as Catherine Sharkey has posited, would be to permit juries to award punitive
damages payable to the state for “societal compensation.” Sharkey, supra note
166 at 353–54. Such damages likewise “forc[e] cost internalization” of the full
consequences of reprehensible conduct. Id. at 354.
175. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(f) (2000); MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-165(3)(d)(ii) (2002); N.J. STAT. 2A:15-5.14(c) (2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-26 (2000).
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automatically suspending a person’s driver’s license if the driver refuses
to take a breath-analysis test—that states have a “paramount interest” in
combating drunken driving.176 If Congress were to enact a maritime law
allowing heightened punitive awards in cases of intoxication, it is hard
to imagine the Court disallowing that assessment.
In the end, the only governmental tactic that may be truly off limits
if pursued by a legislative strategy would be purposely subjecting
defendants to unpredictable or randomized punitive awards. One might
argue that such unpredictability is useful in order to prevent companies
from conducting cost-benefit analyses regarding the advisability of
wrongful courses of action.177 But as Justice O’Connor explained in one
of the Court’s early punitive damages cases:
[t]he Due Process Clause does not permit a State to classify
arbitrariness as a virtue. Indeed, the point of due process—of
the law in general―is to allow citizens to order their behavior.
A State can have no legitimate interest in deliberately making
the law so arbitrary that citizens will be unable to avoid
punishment based solely on bias or whim.178
3. Establishing Maximum Punishments
In the criminal sentencing realm, the Court has made clear time
and again that “[r]eviewing courts . . . should grant substantial
deference to the broad authority that legislatures necessarily possess in
determining the types and limits of punishments for crimes.”179 Indeed,
176. Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 17 (1979); see also id. at 25 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) (it “cannot be doubted” that this state interest is “significant”);
Skinner v. Railway Executives Labor Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 620–21 (1989)
(discussing the government’s strong interest in ensuring safety in transportation
through deterring the use of alcohol or drugs on duty); South Dakota v. Dole,
483 U.S. 203, 208–09 (1987) (holding that a congressional provision tying federal
aid to establishing tough standards for drunk driving was legitimate means of
promoting safety on nation’s highways).
177. See Rustad, supra note 32, at 1349–50 (“[I]t is arguable that capping
punitive damages cripples the deterrent function of punitive damages because
the total punitive liability is predictable.”); Amelia J. Toy, Comment, Statutory
Punitive Damages Caps and the Profit Motive: An Economic Perspective, 40 EMORY L.
J. 303, 335 (1991) (arguing same). An example of a company performing
something like this kind of cost-benefit analysis is the notorious Ford Pinto case,
in which the automobile manufacturer was aware of a safety hazard in its
vehicles but decided not to fix it on the theory that paying damages in lawsuits
would be cheaper than fixing the problem. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119
Cal. App. 3d 757 (1981).
178. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 59 (1991) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting).
179. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983); see also Rummel v. Estelle, 445
U.S. 263, 274 (1980) (acknowledging “reluctance to review legislatively
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notwithstanding the Eighth Amendment’s express prohibition against
“cruel and unusual punishment,”180 the Court has said that “marked
divergences both in underlying theories of sentencing and in the length
of prescribed prison terms are the inevitable, often beneficial, result of the
federal structure.”181 Courts should be so “reluctant to review
legislatively mandated terms of imprisonment” that “successful
challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences should be
exceedingly rare.”182 As long as a state proffers a “reasonable basis for
believing” that the length of a prison sentence advances legitimate state
interests, courts should uphold the sentence.183
Based on these principles, the Supreme Court has found a prison
sentence substantively excessive exactly once in its history. In Solem v.
Helm, the Court held that imposing a sentence upon a recidivist offender
of life without the possibility of parole for uttering a “no account” check
violated the Eighth Amendment.184 At the same time, the Court has
upheld a sentence of twenty-five years to life for a “third strike” of
stealing $399 of merchandise from a golf pro shop;185 a life sentence for a
third strike of obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses;186 a sentence of forty
years in prison for possession with intent to distribute and distribution
of nine ounces of marijuana;187 and a life sentence for a first offense of
possessing 672 grams of cocaine.188 In the more recent of the three strikes
cases, the Court upheld a sentence that was at least 12.5 times longer
(due to the defendant’s recidivism) than the state’s maximum
punishment for the underlying offense189—a measuring stick one might

mandated terms of imprisonment”); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 379
(1910) (“The function of the legislature is primary, its exercises fortified by
presumptions of right and legality, and is not to be interfered with lightly, nor
by any judicial conception of their wisdom or propriety.”).
180. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (emphasis added).
181. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 999 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring
in part and concurring in judgment) (emphasis added); see also Solem, 463 U.S. at
291 n.17 (“The inherent nature of our federal system” may result in “a wide
range of constitutional sentences.”).
182. Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374 (1982) (per curiam) (internal citations
omitted).
183. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 28 (2003).
184. 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983).
185. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 11.
186. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 264 (1980).
187. Hutto, 454 U.S. at 370.
188. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 961 (1991).
189. The defendant’s third strike in the case was grand theft. Ewing, 538 U.S.
at 18. The crime is a “wobbler” under California law, which is punishable either
as a misdemeanor or as a felony. If treated as a felony, the offense was
presumptively punishable at the time by two years in prison. CAL. PENAL CODE §
489(b) (1999). The offense was punishable by three years if any aggravating
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see as roughly equivalent to a punitive-to-compensatory-damages ratio.
The Court also has held that once states have statutory mechanisms in
place for structuring sentencing decisions, state judiciaries need not
perform any kind of proportionality review―not even in capital cases.190
To be sure, the Court has taken a less deferential approach to states’
determinations respecting which offenders should be subject to capital
punishment. The Court has disallowed states’ attempts to expand
capital punishment with respect to crimes against individuals beyond
cases in which a homicide occurs.191 And even then, it has held that
states may not impose the death penalty upon individuals who are
juveniles192 or mentally retarded193 when they commit their offenses.
But even these decisions—especially the Court’s most recent
holding in Kennedy v. Louisiana—can be seen as deriving primarily from
procedural considerations. In Kennedy, the Court held that a state may not
punish the crime of child rape with the death penalty.194 Applying its
now-familiar two-step Eighth Amendment analysis, the Court
determined that (1) the small number of states authorizing such
punishment indicated a national consensus against it, and (2) the Court’s
own independent judgment confirmed that capital punishment was
inappropriate for the crime. The first of these considerations
demonstrated that the death penalty in this context was random in the
sense that offenders in the vast majority of states cannot receive it.195
The second consideration, while commonly characterized (and
criticized) as hinging on the Court’s own perception of proportionality,
was grounded in part on a similar concern for consistency. The Court
noted that even in Louisiana the death penalty had been “most
infrequent[ly]” imposed for child rape.196 And the Court expressed
doubt that, in contrast to homicide, it was possible in this context “to
identify standards that would guide [juries] so the penalty is reserved
factors had been present, see CAL. RULES OF COURT 4.421 (2009), but none besides
recidivism were. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 40.
190. See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37 (1984).
191. E.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2659 (2008) (announcing this
categorical rule and applying it to crime of rape of a child); Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584 (1977) (barring capital punishment for rape of an adult); Eberheart v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 917 (1977) (prohibiting capital punishment for aggravated
kidnapping). I should note here that I represented Patrick Kennedy in the
United States Supreme Court.
192. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
193. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
194. Kennedy, 128 S. Ct. at 2641.
195. Id. at 2651–52 (noting that only six states subjected child rape to the death
penalty).
196. Id. at 2661. Over twelve years, Louisiana juries returned two death
sentences for the crime. Id. at 2657.

FISHER_FMT6.DOC

38

5/1/2009 4:29:14 PM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

VOL. 26:1

for the most severe cases of child rape and yet not imposed in an
arbitrary way.”197 Instead of finding that no state reasonably could
conclude that a heinous instance of child rape should be punished by
death, Justice Kennedy’s opinion seems to conclude that there is simply
no way to create any system that would punish the worst child rapes
with death in any kind of standardized manner.
It is quite possible that some members of the Kennedy majority cast
their votes based on a stronger proposition—namely, that someone who
commits child rape (or any other non-homicidal crime against an
individual) is just not culpable enough to be punished by death. Yet
even to the extent that Kennedy rests on this idea, it still is not
incompatible with the observation that the Court’s capital punishment
jurisprudence is predominantly non-substantive in nature. Holding that
an offender must kill someone before being subject to the death penalty
is equivalent to holding, as the Court has indicated a couple of times,
that a defendant must act reprehensibly or recklessly in order to be
subject to punitive damages.198 The holding sets a threshold. Such a
holding says nothing, however, about the key question of how severely
defendants may be punished once their conduct crosses that threshold.
It is not hard to see why the Court has pursued such a
substantively deferential approach to legislatively prescribed
punishments that are capable of being implemented consistently. As my
colleague Pamela Karlan reminded us a few years ago, it is very difficult
to find any socially acceptable metric for measuring the seriousness of a
crime in an “absolute” sense.199 People can sometimes agree that certain
crimes are more serious than others, but empirical studies show that
they “disagree profoundly” over how severely to punish any given
crime.200 This disagreement is hardly surprising. Once we move beyond
“an eye for an eye,” there is no easy way to convert crimes into terms of
punishment—e.g., to determine whether a crime such as second-degree
assault should be punished by five or fifteen years in prison. And once
we move beyond retribution as the exclusive penological goal, it
becomes even more difficult to translate a criminal conviction into an
appropriate term of years for the offender.201 So when a legislature steps
in and attempts to establish a hierarchy of crimes and to assign
197. Id. at 2660.
198. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419; cf.
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983) (adopting common law standard of
recklessness or callous indifference for cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
199. Karlan, supra note 146, at 894.
200. Id. (discussing James Rossi et al., The Seriousness of Crimes: Normative
Structure and Individual Differences, 39 AM. SOC. REV. 224, 225–26 (1974)).
201. Id. at 896.
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sentencing values to those crimes, the Court is loathe to second-guess
the result of that policy-laden work.
All of this reasoning holds at least as true with respect to punitive
damages. It is challenging at the outset to stratify different kinds of
corporate wrongdoing. The Court in Exxon asserted that Exxon’s
conduct was not exceptionally blameworthy in part because its decision
to leave Hazelwood in command despite knowledge that he was
drinking aboard ship was not (1) “driven primarily by a desire for gain”
or (2) derived from a sense that it could hide its misconduct should an
oil spill occur.202 Yet a legislature might well have reached exactly the
opposite conclusion—namely, that corporate conduct not even driven
by a desire for profit (as most if not all corporate decisions are supposed
to be) and done in complete awareness that it will have to pay for any
harm that occurs is particularly callous and thus particularly
reprehensible and in need of deterrence. Certainly, if a legislature
deemed individuals who kill in cold blood and in the bright of day to be
worse than those who kill clandestinely in order to achieve some kind of
gain, one would be hard pressed to categorically disagree.
It is even more difficult to say that any given level of punitive
damages would be unreasonable for a legislature to allow.203 If elected
public officials’ declarations are any indication, virtually the whole state
of Alaska thought it fair to require Exxon to pay five or even ten times
the quantified compensatory damages in the case.204 If Congress has
enacted a law permitting punitive damages of up to five times the
underlying compensatory damages in maritime cases of corporately
enabled drunk driving, it is hard to imagine the Court overriding that
assessment.
Indeed, three aspects of the punitive damages landscape render
legislative decisions to allow high awards even more worthy of
202. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2633 (2008).
203. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein et al. at 2078, 2087 (describing the difficulty juries
have in agreeing on a dollar amount that is appropriate to punish and deter any
given conduct). Perhaps if a legislature sought to impose a purely quasicompensatory approach to punitive damages, one might be able to pronounce
with some degree of confidence that a given award was too high. But to the
extent that punishment and other state interests remain in the mix, legislatively
determined levels of appropriate awards seem highly worthy of respect.
204. The State of Alaska filed an amicus brief in the Supreme Court
supporting the plaintiffs, as did the Alaska Legislative Council (on behalf of the
Alaska State Legislature), all living former governors of the State, and Senator
Ted Stevens. Sitting governor Sarah Palin stated on the day the Court’s decision
was announced that she was “very disappointed” in the Court’s ruling because
it was “not right” or “fair.” See Governor Sarah Palin’s Reaction to Exxon Valdez
Decision (CBS television broadcast June 25, 2008), available at
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5H-26MOxH34 (last visited Feb. 28, 2009).
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deference than decisions to allow long prison sentences. First, the
Constitution provides an explicit check against excessive criminal
punishment (the Eighth Amendment), whereas it contains no such
provision respecting punitive damages.205 As a matter of constitutional
structure, therefore, it would be exceedingly strange, all else being
equal, if courts were supposed to review the severity of criminal
punishment as rigorously as—let alone less rigorously than—the
amount of punitive awards.206
Second, and relatedly, it is worth remembering that criminal
sentences involve removing people from their families and putting them
behind bars for years on end or even killing them. Punitive damages
involve forcing a person or entity (usually a corporation) to pay money.
It does not belittle the significance of the latter to observe that the former
is more serious and deserves closer judicial scrutiny. Just ask an
independent businessperson whether she would rather spend years in
prison or dole out a large chunk of her corporation’s cash reserves.
Third, legislative determinations concerning criminal punishment
are more likely to be unduly harsh than those concerning punitive
damages. Criminal defendants, as John Hart Ely might observe in this
situation,207 are hardly a powerful or popular constituency. And
legislators “face powerful political pressures” (from the public, from
prosecutors, and sometimes from victim advocacy groups) that
encourage them continuously to “ratchet up sentences.”208 Corporations,
by contrast, typically have at least some advocates in a legislature.
Accordingly, one would expect corporations to be much more able to
achieve temperance in punitive damages legislation.209 Judicial scrutiny
of harsh punitive awards should be less necessary than with respect to
long prison sentences.
Nothing in current case law contradicts any of these postulates. The
Supreme Court has never invalidated a legislatively authorized punitive
award or any other kind of judgment involving enhanced damages on

205. See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text (noting that the Eighth
Amendment does not apply to punitive damages).
206. The same is true with respect to common law and constitutional history,
which traditionally have applied a more robust proportionality principle to
criminal punishment than to punitive damages. Chemerinsky, supra note 11, at
1064–65.
207. See John Ely, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (Harvard University Press 1980).
208. Karlan, supra note 146, at 890; see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 566
(2005) (noting “the general popularity of anticrime legislation”); William J.
Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 531–33
(2001); Nancy E. Marion, Symbolic Policies in Clinton’s Crime Control Agenda, 1
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 67, 103 (1997).
209. See supra notes 151–152 and accompanying text.
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the ground that the damages were too high.210 Nor has it even expressed
the slightest interest in doing so. When the Court in Exxon surveyed
various kinds of legislatively-created punitive and enhanced damages
regimes, the Court took as a given the legitimacy of state statutes
allowing ratios of up to five times compensatory damages or treble
damages regimes under antitrust, RICO, and patent law.211 It did so
despite that fact that it is hard to say that a bland antitrust violation
(which carries a mandatory two-to-one ratio and could result in an
award in the hundreds of millions or billions of dollars212) is worse than
Exxon’s conduct leading to the Exxon Valdez oil spill.
To be sure, the Court has suggested that the Due Process Clause
establishes a one-to-one ratio limit in certain cases involving substantial
harm.213 But it is one thing to say that such a ratio should be a default
rule—that is, the presumptive limit in the absence of legislation covering
the conduct at issue. It would be wholly another thing to enforce such a
one-to-one principle in the face of a considered legislative judgment to
the contrary. Doing so would require the Court to swing a wrecking ball
not just against numerous state laws allowing punitive awards bearing
higher ratios but also against federal antitrust, RICO, and dozens of
other regimes allowing treble damages or higher in cases involving
substantial harm.214 Such judicial action would summon distinct and
uncomfortable echoes of Lochner’s era of “economic substantive due
process.”
Assuming the Court is uninterested or at least unwilling to go
there, the question remains how detailed legislative regulation of
punitive damages must be in order to trigger the kind of judicial
deference that exists respecting criminal sentences. The nature of
criminal sentencing law suggests that a legislature need only enact some
kind of cap for punitive damages in tort cases. That might be enough,
particularly if the cap is a low, single-digit ratio. But it is easy to forget
that even when criminal statutes do nothing more than establish
maximum sentences, they peg those sentences to fairly particular kinds
of conduct (robbery, kidnapping, etc.). Tort systems, by contrast, cover a
wide range of disparate conduct—from assault to trespassing to
defamation to interference with business expectancies. Thus, legislatures
210. The three punitive awards the Court has invalidated―in BMW, State
Farm, and Exxon―all came out of purely common law regimes.
211. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2631–32 (2008).
212. See, e.g., Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 795 (6th Cir.
2002) (upholding $1.05 billion award).
213. Exxon Shipping, 128 S. Ct. at 2634 n.28.
214. See supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text (listing federal statutes
providing for punitive damages in excess of a one-to-one ratio).
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interested in allowing punitive damages above low, single-digit levels—
and I see no reason why such a goal would be impermissible—would do
well to specify maximum ratios with respect to more finely grained
categories of misconduct.
Furthermore, just as in criminal law, one can imagine various kinds
of aggravating or mitigating factors that could apply across categories of
tortious conduct. A defendant’s behavior might involve special levels of
malice, it might cause severe collateral harm, or it might be less in need
of deterrence because of other kinds of punishment already imposed.
Accordingly, legislatures would do well to provide lists of aggravating
and mitigating factors to guide juries respecting permissible amounts of
punitive damages and to require juries to find aggravating factors before
imposing punitive damages above otherwise presumptive thresholds.215
If capital sentencing jurisprudence is any guide, such aggravating
factors need not be terribly precise or narrow. The Court has held that
aggravating factors, such as having prior convictions, committing a
“cold-blooded” act, and inflicting mental anguish adequately narrow
the class of death-eligible offenders.216
Alaska law, ironically enough, already follows such a model. It
provides that punitive damages generally may not exceed the greater of
a three-to-one ratio or $500,000.217 Yet if corporate policymakers were
aware of the adverse consequences of the misconduct or if the
defendant’s action was motivated by financial gain, then the Alaska cap
on punitive damages rises to the greater of a four-to-one ratio, four
times the attempted or achieved financial gain, or $7 million.218 Florida
law contains a similar hierarchy, and adds that no cap exists when the
defendant acted with a specific intent to harm the plaintiff.219
These state laws, however, only scratch the surface of what a
jurisdiction might do. If Congress or a state legislature believes that the
availability of large punitive damages awards in appropriate cases is an
215. This raises an interesting question as to whether the Seventh
Amendment, like the Sixth Amendment, would require juries to find
aggravating factors allowing higher punitive awards than are otherwise
allowed. Cf. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (holding that Sixth
Amendment requires aggravating factors, other than the fact of a prior
conviction, to be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt). At
the very least, it seems like a good idea to require juries to find such necessary
facts.
216. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 593 (2002) (providing the aggravating
factors under Arizona law); Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 973–74 (1994)
(cataloging decisions upholding various states’ aggravating factors).
217. ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020(f) (2008).
218. ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020(g) (2008).
219. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(1) (2005). For another similar hierarchy, see GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 51-12-5.1(f) & (g) (2000).
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important means of furthering some governmental interest, it could
enact a set of guidelines much like some states’ criminal sentencing
guidelines.220 Or a legislature could enact a whole “punitive damages
reform act.” Once it did, it is extremely difficult to imagine the Supreme
Court invoking the Constitution to declare any particular award
substantively excessive.
B.

Criminal Sentencing

The Supreme Court’s merging of punitive damages jurisprudence
with criminal sentencing jurisprudence may also have a significant effect
on certain sentencing systems. Though it is often forgotten in light of the
academic focus on the evolving and lately dramatic story of federal
sentencing (and to a lesser extent on the recent movement in many states
toward various forms of guideline or presumptive sentencing), many
states in the country still follow a general model of granting unfettered
sentencing discretion within widely prescribed sentencing ranges. These
systems resemble the common law system of awarding punitive
damages and effectively retain all of the vices of the old federal system
that the Court decried in Exxon.
The states that follow a criminal sentencing model that most closely
resembles the common law method of assessing punitive damages are
the six states that provide for jury sentencing.221 While there is some
variation among these systems, the systems generally allow juries
unfettered discretion to select sentences for felonies within broad
sentencing ranges. In Virginia, for example, rape is punishable by
between five years and life.222 With respect to crimes that do not carry
specific ranges, class two felonies are punishable by between twenty
years and life; class three felonies are punishable by between five and
twenty years; class four felonies are punishable by between two and ten
years; and class five felonies are punishable by between one and ten

220. This notion was first advanced in Sunstein et al., supra note 11, at 2113,
2125; see also Jenny Miao Jiang, Comment, Whimsical Punishment: The Vice of
Federal Intervention, Constitutionalization, and Substantive Due Process in Punitive
Damages Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 793, 813–24 (2006) (advocating creation of punitive
damages guideline system mirroring Federal Sentencing Guidelines). No
legislature has yet picked up the idea, perhaps in part because none thus far has
realized how much substantive flexibility it would have if it did so.
221. The six states are Arkansas, Kentucky, Missouri, Oklahoma, Texas and
Virginia. Nancy J. King & Rosevelt L. Noble, Felony Jury Sentencing in Practice: A
Three-State Study, 57 VAND. L. REV. 885, 886 (2004).
222. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-6(B) (2004).
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years.223 Virginia and two other states have adopted sentencing
guidelines to assist judges when sentencing within these wide ranges
following bench trials and guilty pleas, but, curiously enough, forbid
juries from being given this information when imposing sentences
following jury trials.224 The three other states that allow jury sentencing
likewise give juries no instructions or guidance regarding average or
typical sentences for like offenders.225
Although precious little in the way of systematic, empirical
research has been done respecting the output of these systems, the
(predictable) result appears to be a high degree of variation of sentences
for similarly situated offenders.226 In Virginia, less than one-third of jury
sentences fall within the guidelines recommendations given to judges.227
In a study involving one Texas county, judges related “copious evidence
of unjustified disparity in jury sentences.”228 For instance, one Texas
judge described a gang rape that gave rise to several separate trials. The
juries gave the defendants sentences ranging from a two-year
suspended sentence to a forty-year prison term for the one who
appeared to be the least culpable.229
It requires little reflection to see the strong resemblance between
this situation and the state of affairs that has given rise to the Supreme
Court’s due process jurisprudence regulating punitive damages.
Existing legislation is sparse and does not seriously regularize
223. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-10(a–e) (2004). Other states have similarly broad
ranges. E.g. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-401(a) (2006); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.060(2)
(2006).
224. King & Noble, supra note 221, at 888–89; Nancy J. King & Rosevelt L.
Noble, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: Comparing Severity and Variance in Two
States, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 331, 337 (2005); See, e.g., ARK. CODE. ANN. § 1690-803–04 (2006); Stephanie Gardner Holder, Survey: Criminal Procedure, 16 U.
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 99 (1994); Robert S. Dierker, 32 MISSOURI PRACTICE:
MISSOURI CRIMINAL LAW § 58.8 (2008 update). Based on interviews with judges,
prosecutors, and defense lawyers, King and Noble speculate that these states
may leave juries “in the dark,” in part, to introduce greater variability and
severity into jury sentencing, and thereby to encourage plea bargains. To the
extent that is so, such systems raise an even more serious due process question
than I pose above. See supra notes 178, 179 and accompanying text (describing
Court’s punitive damages law forbidding the introduction of arbitrariness in the
system for deterrent purposes).
225. Those states are Kentucky, Oklahoma, and Texas. King & Noble, supra
note 221, at 888–89.
226. King & Noble, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases, supra note 224, at 351–
57 (reciting findings from a study of jury sentences in Virginia and Arkansas);
Robert A. Weninger, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: A Case Study of El Paso
County, Texas, 45 WASH. UNIV. J. OF URBAN & CONTEMP. LAW. 3, 28–29, 32 (1994).
227. King & Noble, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases, supra note 224, at 354.
228. Weninger, supra note 226, at 28.
229. Id. at 29.
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punishment. Sentences are starkly unpredictable. And defendants
occasionally receive large, outlier sentences without any apparent
explanation. Such defendants, therefore, appear to have a strong
argument that their sentences violate the Due Process Clause and thus
should be reduced. The same appears true for defendants who receive
unusually harsh sentences in states—and there appear to be at least two
and perhaps as many as three dozen such states—that afford judges the
same kind of unfettered discretion.230
To be sure, state systems that allow wide sentencing discretion
contain some features that differentiate them from the common law
system of awarding punitive damages. Most notably, the criminal
statutes always prescribe a maximum sentence, even if it is death or a
prison term of life. Criminal trials in states involve publicly accountable
prosecutors, who may not urge judges and juries to impose maximum
possible punishments as often as plaintiffs’ lawyers do.231 Criminal
sentencing law also contains unique post-adjudication components that
may smooth out unjustified disparities to some degree. Parole boards
are commonly entrusted with the power to release prisoners once they
have served portions of indeterminate sentences. Clemency boards and
state governors likewise have the power—even if very rarely invoked—
to mitigate the severity of outlier sentences. Any serious due process
attack on long sentences imposed in indeterminate sentencing systems
would need to account for these, and other, realities.
My purpose, here, however, is simply to point out that it should be
hard for the Court to avoid applying its new regularization
jurisprudence in the context of a well-framed attack on unstructured
state sentencing systems. Tens of thousands of offenders per year are
sentenced under these kinds of sentencing systems, and their liberty

230. See Dept. of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 1996 National Survey of
State Sentencing Structures 3–6 (classifying 36 states as having “predominately
indeterminate sentencing structure[s],” which tend to allow wide discretion in
sentencing); Jon Wool & Don Stemen, Aggravated Sentencing: Blakely v.
Washington: Practical Implications for State Sentencing Systems, at 3 (Vera Institute
of Justice State Sentencing and Corrections Policy and Practice Review, Aug.
2004) (listing thirteen states as restricting judicial discretion through binding
guidelines and twelve others as having advisory or voluntary guidelines,
leaving the other twenty-five as purely discretionary systems). It appears that no
one has done any recent study to measure variability and sentencing disparities
in such a system. The closest thing to such a study appears to be the national
statistics compiled across jurisdictions that are mentioned in John F. Pfaff, The
Continued Vitality of Structured Sentencing After Blakely: The Effectiveness of
Voluntary Guidelines, 54 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 235 (2006). Obviously, if my analysis
here is right, studies documenting the variability of noncapital prison sentences
in states could become extraordinarily important.
231. See Karlan, supra note 139, at 919.
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surely matters as much as corporations’ pocket books. To the extent the
Due Process Clause has not been brought to bear on these sentencing
systems because solid, statistical evidence documenting unpredictability
does not exist—or, even worse, because members of the Supreme Court
and the relevant state judiciaries are unaware of the parallels between
these systems and the common law system for imposing punitive
damages—that should change. If the mission of the Due Process Clause
is now seriously to regularize punishment, there is no reason why that
mission should be limited to civil cases.232

CONCLUSION
Although the substantive outcome of Exxon suggests at first glance
that the Supreme Court’s constitutional punitive damages jurisprudence
may be poised to become quite substantive and muscular, a more careful
reading—coupled with a comparison to criminal sentencing
proportionality jurisprudence—suggests just the opposite. The Court is
concerned with the unpredictability of punitive damage awards, not
with their amounts per se. Exxon thus sets the stage for the Court’s
punitive damages jurisprudence to be confined almost exclusively to the
realm of procedural due process. The decision leaves it to Congress and
state legislatures to ratify the possibility of imposing large punitive
awards in appropriate cases and plants the seeds of affording extreme, if
not absolute, deference to such democratic determinations.
At the same time, Exxon sets the stage for a potential upheaval of
many states’ systems of imposing criminal punishment. Although the
Court has long held that it will defer to state legislatures’ determinations
concerning the permissible length of prison sentences, Exxon indicates
that the Court—that is, the Due Process Clause—will no longer tolerate
wide and unjustified disparities concerning which individuals receive
unusually long sentences. It may be an ironic legacy of the Exxon Valdez
litigation that the largest corporation in the world, in a one-of-a-kind
federal case, litigated to establish a legal principle that brings longoverdue constitutional oversight to harsh sentences that state courts
sometimes impose upon utterly typical and unremarkable criminal
defendants.
232. Such claims of arbitrariness or gross disproportionality, of course, could
also be cast as Eighth Amendment claims. In this respect, a defendant would
basically be arguing that his sentence is cruel and unusual as measured against
other similarly situated offenders in the same state. It also remains open to states
faced with such claims to clamp down on unpredictability by means of state
common law, mirroring the Supreme Court’s decision to ground the Exxon
decision in federal maritime law, a species of federal common law.

